SOCIAL CHANGE RESEARCH UNIT, UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE DATA ON CROWD INCIDENTS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

RETHINK. REINVENT.

UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

PETER ALEXANDER, CARIN RUNCIMAN AND BOITUMELO MARUPING

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South African Research Chair in Social Change

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A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

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Executive summary

- Between 1997 and 2013 the South African Police Service's (SAPS) Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) recorded 156,230 'crowd incidents'; 90.0% of these were classified as 'crowd (peaceful)' and 10.0% as 'crowd (unrest).

- IRIS documentation of these incidents, which will soon be made public, is analysed in this report. We decode key categories used in IRIS.

- Crowd incidents are not protests. Indeed, a high proportion of incidents relate to recreational, cultural or religious events.

- The number of registered incidents plummeted after 2006 largely due to the re-organisation of public order policing, and this underlines the reality that IRIS statistics chronicle police activity rather than public events *per se*.

- The definition of 'peaceful' and 'unrest' is primarily determined by the character of police intervention, and 'unrest' should not be equated with 'violent'.

- The number of crowd incidents spiked in 1998, 2005/2006 and 2012/2013. There were more unrest incidents in 2012 (1,811) than any other year, and the highest number of peaceful incidents (11,010) was in 2013.

- Geographically, for the 17-year period, the proportion of crowd incidents recorded as unrest varies between 6.3% in KwaZulu-Natal and 16.5% in Western Cape. The number of crowd incidents *per capita* was substantially higher in North West than in any other province.

- IRIS has 78 different options for assigning 'motive' to an incident. Aggregating these into 10 groups reveals that, overall, 'motives' that are labour-related are the most numerous (24% of the total). With unrest incidents, community-related motives are the most common (27% of the total).

- Recognising the importance of IRIS for public accountability, we recommend that, SAPS incorporate clear definitions of its categories and options, addressing the concern to record *protests* that exists within public, political and policing spheres.

- We recommend three kinds of additional research. First, further inquiry as to how incidents are defined, recorded and categorised. Secondly, further analysis of notes that accompany entries for each incident, including distinguishing which are protests. Thirdly, analysis relating police-recorded protests to media-reported protests, and quantitative analysis linking protests with social and demographic variables (e.g. unemployment).

Authors

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We are obliged to the South African Police Service for releasing the Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) data on which the report is based. Lt. Col. Vernon Day responded helpfully to requests for information about IRIS and we are grateful for his co-operation. Records were obtained through an application made under the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), a significant achievement of the struggle against apartheid. The South African History Archive assisted with the application, and their expertise is much appreciated.

Our analysis has been assisted by the hard work of three senior research assistants: Mahlatse Rampedi, Sehlaphi Sibanda and Boikanyo Moloto. We received help in translating Afrikaans from Laurinda van Tonder and Esmé Grobler. Statistical advice was provided by Richard Devey and Juliana van Staden at UJ's Statistical Consultation Service (Statkon). Lucinda Becorny provided us with administrative support.

Trevor Ngwane, Jane Duncan, Patrick Bond and Johan Burger engaged with us on issues around IRIS data over a number of years and/or read an earlier draft of this report. Craig MacKenzie and Caroline O'Reilly did proof reading, UJ Graphics designed the cover, and Postnet undertook the printing. Colleagues, students and associates at the Social Change Research Unit provided camaraderie.

Abbreviations

IRIS	Incident Registration Information System
PAIA	Promotion of Access to Information Act
POP	Public Order Policing
RGA	Regulation of Gatherings Act
SAHA	South African History Archive
SAPS	South African Police Service

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Appendix 11. Categories of ‘environmentals’ recorded in IRIS database, 1997-2013, peaceful and unrest’

1. Introduction

1.1 Source of data

This report is based on data derived from the South African Police Service (SAPS) Incident Registration Information System (IRIS). Records were obtained with assistance from the South African History Archive (SAHA), which requested them through a Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) application. SAHA will make the data available to the public through its website. We are obliged to the SAPS for its co-operation.[1]

The initial request, which was formulated on the basis of earlier releases of information, was for:

> *Copies of any and all records in the South African Police Services' Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) as follows: 1. Data recorded from 1997-2013 by each calendar year for each incident class known as (i) "crowd (unrest)" and (ii) "crowd (peaceful)", with this broken down by (a) geography (provinces and nationally), and this further disaggregated according to (b) motive.*[2]

Figure 1. Photograph of IRIS crowd incident data presented on Excel spreadsheet

	SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE - INCIDENT REGISTRATION INFORMATION SYSTEM (IRIS)								
2	Date Occurred	Eventuality Classification	Province	Residential	Environment	Motive	Incident Numbe	Line No	Notes
3	2007-01-11	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	KWAZAKELE (PE)	PUBLIC ROAD	ATTACK ON SECURITY FORCE	554237	1	ON THE 2007-01-11 ACCU MEMBERS WERE MONITORING A MARCH STARS FROM DAKU ROAD
4	2007-01-11	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	KWAZAKELE (PE)	PUBLIC ROAD	ATTACK ON SECURITY FORCE	554237	2	TO NJOLI SQUARE THE PURPOSE OF THE MARCH BY THE COMMUNITY TO SHOW THE PUBLIC
5	2007-01-11	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	KWAZAKELE (PE)	PUBLIC ROAD	ATTACK ON SECURITY FORCE	554237	3	THAT THEY WERE DISATISFIED ABOUT THE KILLING OF THE POLICE OFFICERS WHILE
6	2007-01-11	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	KWAZAKELE (PE)	PUBLIC ROAD	ATTACK ON SECURITY FORCE	554237	4	THEY ATTENDING THE COMPLAINT THE MARCH ENDED PEACEFULLY AT NJOLI SQUARE
7	2007-01-11	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	KWAZAKELE (PE)	PUBLIC ROAD	ATTACK ON SECURITY FORCE	554237	5	+ - 500 PEPLE.
8	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	1	ON 2007-01-06 AT ABOUT 13.30 RADIO CONTROL REPORTED THAT A GROUP OF PEOPLE
9	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	2	HAD GATHERED AT WALTER SISULU UNIVERSITY. CAPT MJUQU OF ACCU EAST LONDON
10	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	3	AND MEMBERS WERE SENT TO THE SCENE.
11	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	4	CAPT MJUQU REPORTED THAT THERE WERE 2 GROUPS OF ABOUT 250 EACH. THEY WERE ANC
12	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	5	YOUTH LEAGUE MEMBERS. APPARENTLY ONE GROUP SUPPORTED MR MBALULA FOR THE
13	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	6	PRESIDENCY WHILE THE OTHER GROUP OPPOSSED HIM.
14	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	7	16.15 CAPT MJUQU FURTHER REPORTS THAT AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE 2 GROUPS IT
15	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	8	CAME TO LIGHT THAT THE 1 GROUP WANTED TO HOLD A JOINT MEETING TO RESOLVE
16	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	9	THEIR DIFFERENCES. HOWEVER THE OTHER GROUP REFUSED. CAPT MJUQU REQUESTED
17	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	10	THAT THE 2 GROUPS DISPERSE WHICH THEY DID. MEMBERS OF ACCU REMAINED ON THE
18	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	11	SCENE. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.
19	2007-01-06	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	BERLIN	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	553729	12	SAP10/235/01/2007 THEY DISPERSED AT 16.10.
20	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	1	ON 2007-02-21 APPROXIMATELY AT 12.50 WALTER SISULU UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
21	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	2	GATHERED AT MDANTSANE CAMPUS.THESE STUDENTS ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE REGISTRATIO
22	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	3	PROCESS AT THE UNIVERSITY +-250 OF THEM ARE SINGING AND TOY-TOYING WITH IN
23	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	4	THE UNIVERSITY GROUNDS .ALL IN ORDER.
24	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	5	AT 13.19 INSP OLIVIER REPORT THAT 3 OTHREE BUSES CARRYING ABOUT 200 STUDENTS
25	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	6	HAVE LEFT THE MDANTSANE CAMPUS AND ARE PROCEEDING TO BUFFALO STREET ,EAST
26	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	7	LONDON CAMPUS.INSP PAUTZ AT OPS ROOM INFORMED SUPT BARNARD OF EAST LONDON
27	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	8	SAPS THAT MORE MANPOWER FROM ACCU IS NOT AVAILABLE AS THEY ARE ESCORTING
28	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	9	HIGH PROFILE CASH IN TRANSIT ROBBERS TO COURT.
29	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	10	AT 14.05 SUPT BARNARD REPORT THAT THE STUDENTS ARE TOY-TOYING INSIDE THE
30	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	11	UNIVERSITY PREMISES AT BUFFALO STREET CAMPUS. NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.
31	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	12	AT 15.30 SUPT BARNARD REPORT THAT THE STUDENTS DISPERSED PEACEFULLY WITH
32	2007-02-21	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	MDANTSANE (CISKEI)	UNIVERSITY	CAMPUS/TERTIARY CONFLICT	557247	13	THEIR BUSES .NO INCIDENTS REPORTED.ALL IN ORDER SAP10/941/02/2007.
33	2007-05-08	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	DEAL PARTY (PE)	INDUSTRIAL AREA	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	562795	1	ON TUESDAY 2007-05-08 AT 09.15 INSP SNYMAN OF THE INFO REPORTS THAT THEIR ARE
34	2007-05-08	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	DEAL PARTY (PE)	INDUSTRIAL AREA	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	562795	2	+-150 PEOPLE STRIKE INFRONT OF FLORENTIA COMPANY THEY ARE UNSATISFIED WITH
35	2007-05-08	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	DEAL PARTY (PE)	INDUSTRIAL AREA	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	562795	3	THE H.R MANAGER MR HICKS NUMSA CALL IT A UNPROCTECTED STRIKE.BECAUSE THE
36	2007-05-08	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	DEAL PARTY (PE)	INDUSTRIAL AREA	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	562795	4	WORKERS HAS NO REASON TO STRIKE.
37	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	1	ON THURSDAY 2007-08-23, 13.15,15 MEMBERS OF THE TAC TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN
38	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	2	LEAD BY MS MONALISA NQQISHI GATHERED AT THE MATERNITY SECTION OF FRERE
39	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	3	HOSPITAL EAST LONDON. THEY WERE AWAITING THE MIN. OF HEALTH MRS MANTO
40	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	4	TSHABALALA MSIMANG WHO WAS TO VISIT THE HOSPITAL. THEY DISPLAYED THE FOLLOW-
41	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	5	ING POSTERS (1) FIRE MANTO (2) REINSTATE NOZIZWE.
42	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	6	14.45 INSP OTTO REPORTS THAT COMMISSIONER HLOBA ADDRESSED THE PICKETERS AND
43	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	7	INFORMED THEM THAT THE MINISTER WAS NOT GOING TO VISIT THE HOSPITAL AS WAS
44	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	8	ALLEGED. HOWEVER THE TAC REMAINED ON THE PAVEMENT AND CONTINUED TO PICKET
45	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	9	16.00 SGT KAVE REPORTS THAT THE PICKETERS HAVE ALL BOARDED BUSSES AND HAVE
46	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	10	LEFT. NO SERIOUS INCIDENTS REPORTED.
47	2007-08-23	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	EAST LONDON	HOSPITAL/CLINIC	DEMAND DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE	570872	11	SAP 13/763/08/2007
48	2007-03-27	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	QUEENSTOWN	COURTHOUSE	DEMAND RELEASE OF SUSPECTS	559780	1	ON 2007-03-27 AT 09.00 CCU MEMBERS WENT TO NTHABATEMBA COURTHOUSE TO MONITOR
49	2007-03-27	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	QUEENSTOWN	COURTHOUSE	DEMAND RELEASE OF SUSPECTS	559780	2	PEOPLE GATHERING AT THE COURT.ALMOST 100 PEOPE PICKETING AND TOYI-TOYING
50	2007-03-27	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	QUEENSTOWN	COURTHOUSE	DEMAND RELEASE OF SUSPECTS	559780	3	OUTSIDE THE COURT.THE REASON FOR THEIR GATHERING WAS THAT THE LOCAL POLICE
51	2007-03-27	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	QUEENSTOWN	COURTHOUSE	DEMAND RELEASE OF SUSPECTS	559780	4	MEMBERS ARRESTED 8XELDERLY PEOPLE FOR KIDNAPPING AND ASSAULTING STOCK THIEVE
52	2007-03-27	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	QUEENSTOWN	COURTHOUSE	DEMAND RELEASE OF SUSPECTS	559780	5	THEY TOOK THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS.THE PEOPLE GATHERING DEMANDING THE
53	2007-03-27	CROWD(PEACEFUL)	P COMM EASTERN CAPE	QUEENSTOWN	COURTHOUSE	DEMAND RELEASE OF SUSPECTS	559780	6	RELEASE OF THE ELDERLY PERSONS.THE COURT CASE WAS POSTPONED UNTIL 03APRIL THE

The records list 156,230 crowd incidents recorded between 1997 and 2013.[3] This is a vast database. IRIS has never before released anything remotely similar in terms of scale or breadth. It provides an unparalleled resource for researchers

[1] SAHA's reference number is SAH-2014-SAP-0018.

[2].While this request seems simple, getting it right meant understanding terms used by IRIS, and this involved tracking SAPS annual reports, ministerial statements and previous releases of data, making informal requests and submitting an earlier PAIA application.

[3] We have made a similar request for 2014 data, and await a response.

interested in public order policing and protests, and, if used wisely, can make a valuable contribution to public debate and policy making.

1.2 Columns

The records are presented in the form of 36 Excel spread sheets. Half of these sheets cover 'crowd (peaceful)' incidents and half 'crowd (unrest)' incidents. There are two sheets for each of the 17 years and two for amalgamated data. On each of the sheets the data is divided into eight columns (see Figure 1). These are:

1. Date occurred.
2. Eventuality classification. Either crowd (peaceful) or crowd (unrest).
3. Province. South Africa's nine provinces.[4]
4. Residential. The place where the incident occurred.
5. Environment. The kind of place where the incident occurred (e.g. public road).
6. Motive. What the incident was about (e.g. demand wage increases).
7. Incident number. Each incident has a unique number.
8. Line number. The notes spread over numerous rows, so for a single incident there might be, for example, 12 lines.
9. Notes. A brief report on the incident.

We delve into the meaning of these categories below. While the number of options within categories is limited (albeit extensive in most cases), the notes are open ended.[5] Unlike other columns, which are all in English, the notes are frequently in Afrikaans.

IRIS also registers information about incident 'type', which includes 23 categories, ranging from 'Assembly (Church)' through 'Barricade' to 'Strike (Stay-away)'.[6] In addition, IRIS now manually captures information about xenophobia and community protests, abstracting this data from the main database. We only recently became aware of these records, and they are not considered at this stage.

1.3 Purpose of report

This report is limited to a discussion of crowd incidents, and how these have been categorised and conceptualised by IRIS. From the outset it is important to note that crowd incidents are not protests.

[4] The options here are 'P COMM EASTERN CAPE' etc., where 'P COMM' refers to the area coming under the specified provincial commissioner.

[5] It may not be possible for SAHA to release this information immediately because it often includes personal information. We informed SAHA about potential problems in this regard, and have not disclosed the names of any individuals in this report.

[6] The list is contained in a letter from Major JWJ Joubert, Commander: Operational Public Order Info Analysis and IRIS Management, to Professor Jane Duncan, 6 March 2015. We are grateful to Prof. Duncan for sharing the letter.

The authors are interested in analysing protests, and, ultimately, we intend to use IRIS data to assist in this process. Indeed, the present study arose out of a large project known as Rebellion of the Poor, which focuses on community protests.[7] In addition to collecting a substantial body of interview data, this project has also developed the largest database of media-reported protest incidents. However, in order to conduct a rigorous interrogation of IRIS statistics from the perspective of protest analysis, it is necessary first to understand the data in its own terms, providing minimal interpretation. What is the data measuring? Who is capturing the data, for what purpose and with what limitations? What is the relationship between the theory of IRIS and what happens in practice? Many people – police, politicians, pundits – have jumped to conclusions when utilising the data, and this is something we wish to avoid. While we have attempted to represent the rationale and implications of IRIS as accurately as possible, errors may have crept in, and we welcome corrections and additional data that can improve the analysis.

We have called this report a 'preliminary analysis', and it is no more than this. We have attempted to expand public knowledge about IRIS data in the expectation that this will provide clarifications, thereby assisting further research. The report poses far more questions than it answers. We make no apology for this. It reflects the present state of our knowledge and we hope that other researchers will assist in providing answers. However, on our side, we have begun the process of interpreting the data for the purpose of distinguishing different kinds of protests and for counting their numbers, and we hope to present a report on this in the near future.

1.4 Definitions: complexity and confusion

SAPS publishes summary statistics for 'crowd-related incidents' in its annual reports, which cover the 12 months to 31 March each year. These are broken down into 'peaceful incidents' and 'unrest-related incidents'. From time to time, the Minister of Police (e.g. National Assembly 2012) has provided similar statistics for 'crowd management incidents', dividing these between 'peaceful' and 'unrest/violent'. The distinction, if one exists, between 'crowd-related' and 'crowd management' and between 'unrest-related' and 'unrest/violent' is unclear. However, quantitatively, the difference is not significant – in 2010/11 the totals were, respectively, 12,651 and 12,654.[8] 'Violent' is not normally a synonym of 'unrest', and its usage is worth noting. IRIS data sticks to 'unrest', and does not utilise 'violent'. We return to this in section 2.

The word 'protest' is not used in SAPS reports or in the minister's statements mentioned above, and it is not used in IRIS statistics examined here. It is now crystal clear that 'incidents' cannot be equated with protests. The origin of the confusion is

[7] See Alexander 2010, Alexander 2012, Alexander & Pfaffe 2014, Alexander, Runciman & Ngwane 2014a, and Alexander, Runciman & Ngwane 2014b.

[8] Specifically, see SAPS 2013: 101 and National Assembly 2012. The difference in other years may have been somewhat higher (see Alexander 2010: 27).

uncertain, but it is present in a monograph by Bilkis Omar, published in 2007. She writes that IRIS 'confirmed that protest marches between 2002 and 2005 had increased … [by] 50 per cent (see Figure 3)', but her Figure 3, sourced to the SAPS, is entitled 'Total crowd management incidents' (Omar 2007: 17-18). More recently, two Media24 investigators published a story that elided 'service delivery protests' and IRIS data for incidents listed with the 'motive' 'dissatisfied with service delivery' (Saba & van der Merwe 2013). These two things seem similar, but they are not the same. A subsequent article in *City Press* went further, claiming that 'between November [2013] and January [2014], 2,947 service delivery protests have taken place across the country' (du Plessis, Ndlangisa & Saba 2014). A simple comparison with the earlier Media24 analysis would show this to be an erroneous claim, and even if 'service delivery protest' is conflated with 'protest' the figures still exaggerate the position, as we will see later. Perhaps the authors confused 'service delivery protest' and 'crowd incident'. One wonders whether inaccuracy was a consequence of misinformation or a misreading.

Further confusion arises from a shift in the meaning of 'gathering'. The 1993 Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) defines the word as meaning: 'any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in or on any public road … or any public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air'. It then specifies that the 'assembly, concourse or procession' must be such that either (a) 'the principles, policy, actions or failure to act of any government, political party or organization … are discussed, attacked, criticized, promoted or propagated', or '(b) Held to form pressure groups, to hand over petitions to any person, or to mobilize or demonstrate support for or opposition to the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions of any person or body of persons or institution.' That is, the Act defines 'gathering' in political terms. A 2014 SAPS (2014) *National Instruction* uses precisely the same wording, but ends at the word 'air'. That is, the concept had been depoliticised. It is not clear to us exactly when this occurred, but Jane Duncan (2010) showed that by 1998 the Makana Municipality (which includes Grahamstown) was considering applications for events such as 'fun runs' as if they were 'gatherings'.

To complicate matters further the *National Instruction* (SAPS 2014b: 2) also states: 'crowd management means the policing of assemblies, demonstrations and all *gatherings* … whether recreational, peaceful, or of an unrest nature'. Here usage of 'gathering' corresponds to its inclusion as one of the 23 'types' of 'crowd management' incident mentioned above.[9] Disaggregation of 'assemblies' from 'gatherings' and the mention of 'demonstrations' -– which, by definition, include 15 or fewer people – indicate that 'crowd management', hence crowd management data, is

[9] The full list of incident types contained in the letter cited in Note 5 includes: Assembly (Elections), Assembly (Church), Assembly (Festivity/Commemorate), Assembly (Meeting), Assembly (Music festival), Assembly (Political meeting), Assembly (Poster demonstration), Assembly (Procession), Assembly (Sport), Barricade, Boycott action, Demonstration, Disaster/Catastrophe, Gathering, Hostage situation, Intimidation, Occupation, Sit-in, Stay away action, Strike (Labour affairs), Strike (Occupation), Strike (Stay away).

not restricted to events involving more than 15 people.[10] While the *Instruction* distinguishes 'recreational' from 'peaceful' and 'unrest', as if it were a separate class of incident, IRIS classifies recreational incidents under 'peaceful' and 'unrest'.

One further usage of 'gathering' was present in the Minister of Police's response to a parliamentary question. In this it was stated: 'During 2009-10, the most common reason for conducting crowd management (peaceful) *gatherings* [our emphasis] was labour related demands …' We won't burden the reader by attempting to unravel this muddle, but simply assert, yet again, that what the SAPS records is 'incidents', and these are not restricted to 'gatherings' (National Assembly 2012). To conclude, IRIS counts crowd management *incidents*, or crowd incidents for short. These cannot be equated with either protests or gatherings.

1.5 IRIS and Public Order Policing

IRIS is closely connected with public order policing. Information is captured locally, at unit level, by uniformed public order police, and then checked, stored and analysed centrally by IRIS staff. The data is used to monitor public order interventions, inform policy and motivate for increased funding. Before undertaking even a preliminary analysis of statistics generated by IRIS, one needs some grasp of the history of post-apartheid public order policing.

IRIS was established in 1992, at a moment when heightened conflict in the public sphere matched tense negotiations, and there was much uncertainty about the form that public order policing should take. By 1996 a philosophy of 'crowd control' had been replaced, at least officially, by one of 'crowd management', in which police and organisers co-operate to ensure that gatherings are peaceful. Public Order Policing (POP) units were established and IRIS began recording crowd management incidents. Initially the POP units had about 11,000 members (Omar 2007: 15; SAPS 2011).

In 2002 the SAPS's priorities shifted and POP units were restructured into Area Crime Combatting Units (ACCUs). According to Vally (2009), quoting a 2004 SAPS policy document, 'reasons for the change included "the decrease in the number and intensity of major demonstrations, violent marches and labour unrest since the inception of democracy"'. Crime prevention, previously a secondary function, became primary, and command was decentralised to area commissioners, who deployed the units to assist local stations with regular crime combatting duties. Staffing was reduced to 7,327 members (Omar 2007: 15; SAPS 2011).

In 2006, policing areas were disbanded, and, while this was aimed at further strengthening stations, the units were placed under central command, and re-named

[10] The *Instruction* defines 'demonstration' as meaning 'a congregation of persons consisting of more than one person (but not more than 15 persons), demonstrating for or against any person, cause, action, or failure to take action.' This is similar to the formulation used in the RGA.

Crime Combatting Units (CCUs) (Ministry of Police n.d.: 15).[11] Simultaneously, staffing was cut to 2,595 members. There were just 23 units, compared to 42 in 1995 (SAPS 2011). The SAPS's capacity to undertake public order policing had been further diminished, just at the moment when, as Omar (2006: 1) noted at the time, there was a 'growing number and intensity of service delivery protests and riots'.

Johan Burger (2014: 19) commented: 'The short-sightedness of this decision was soon exposed when widespread xenophobic violence erupted in March 2008'. The CCUs were expanded – reaching a peak during the 2010 World Cup – and in 2011 re-prioritisation of public order policing was signalled by returning to the 'Public Order Policing' (POP) label (Tait & Marks 2011: 19).[12] In 2013 there were 4,642 members, and in January 2014 SAPS Commissioner Riah Phiyega announced that the number would almost double, to about 9,000 (Burger 2014: 19-20; eNCA 2014).[13]

1.6 IRIS classifications

IRIS records five main classes of incidents, all associated with public order policing interventions. These are (1) 'Crowd (peaceful)' and (2) 'Crowd (unrest)', which are the focus of this report and considered in detail below. (3) 'Crime prevention'. This includes a wide variety of activities – roadblocks, VIP protection, monitoring hijack hotspots, etc. – sometimes linked to a larger operation involving Metro police or other SAPS units. (4) 'Support'. A range of activities such as tactical support for a sheriff carrying out Incidents recorded by IRIS, 1997-2013, transporting criminals, dealing with overturned trucks, and disaster management. (5) Unrest (other). Intervention in conflict between groups of civilians, notably 'taxi wars', but also 'rural factions', 'urban gangs' and 'political violence' (rare these days). There is a sixth class, 'movement', introduced for the World Cup and not used much since.[14]

Figure 2 shows the number of incidents related to these classes. It is based on information provided by the SAPS in response to an earlier PAIA application. 'Other incidents' includes 'support', 'unrest (other)' and 'movement'. The graph demonstrates the degree to which public order police are engaged in non-public order policing, especially the crime combatting/prevention function. In 2000, public order policing units participated in 29,605 crime prevention incidents, which might be compared with the peak year for crowd management, 2013, when there were 12,709 incidents for peaceful and unrest combined. The importance of crime combatting

[11] At SAPS headquarters the CCUs were located within Operation Response Services (ORS). Public order policing still comes under this division, which also covers IRIS, the National Intervention Units, the Special Task Force, Tactical Response Teams, Mobile Operations, and the SAPS Airwing. ORS works closely with NATJOINTS, the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure. Most of these structures played a role at Marikana.

[12] In this report we distinguish between 'public order policing', all in lower case, and Public Order Policing (i.e. POP), with the former including duties carried out by ACCUs and CCUs.

[13] On public order policing see also Duncan 2014.

[14] In practice there is a measure of overlap between classes, and, for instance, taxi conflicts appear as crowd incidents as well as unrest (other).

activities is reflected in arrests. In 2010/11, the breakdown was as follows: crime prevention – 39,020 persons, crowd management – 3,266 persons, other – 1,016 persons (SAPS 2011).

In 2012 and 2013 there was a marked upturn in 'support' and 'unrest (other)' incidents, matched, in 2013, by a sharp decline in 'crime prevention' incidents. But the most remarkable feature of the graph is the way it reveals a crash in the number of incidents following the 2006 restructuring. This was less conspicuous with crowd (unrest) and unrest (other), suggesting that CCUs had to prioritise collective unrest and violence when it did occur. The rapid decline in recorded crowd (peaceful) incidents, roughly 90% of all crowd incidents, is also reflected in Figures 3 and 4. Data for media-reported protests shows increased numbers of incidents in 2007, 2008 and 2009 after a slight lull in 2006, and there can be no doubt that the dip in IRIS-registered crowd incidents reflects reduced capacity to intervene in and even monitor gatherings and other public events – and perhaps, sometimes, a failure to record responses – rather than a reduction in the number of such occasions. Something like 30% of crowd events that would have been included in earlier years was simply not recorded. This under-recording was uneven. At one point there were no units at all in Mpumalanga, and very few incidents were recorded. Withdrawal of units from less strategic centres means that under-recording would be even greater in remoter areas (see also Vally 2009).

Figure 2. Incidents recorded by IRIS, 1997-2013[15]



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

IRIS details the number of public events the public order police record, not the number of events that occur. There will always be under-recording, but the extent of under-recording is related to the number of units. It is reasonable to assume that under-recording occurred least in the period up until 2002 and was worst in the years

[15] IRIS data for 'Incidents: query per classification'. Available on SAHA website, reference number SAH 2014-SAP-008, call number AL2878_B01.7.28.

2007 to 2009, and that it is probably still greater now than 2003 to 2006. If we factor this into our overview, the general upward trend in numbers of crowd incidents should be steeper.

2. Peaceful and unrest incidents

2.1 Distinctions: official

'Crowd (peaceful)' and 'crowd (unrest)' both involve crowd management, but IRIS treats them as distinct classes of 'incident' or 'eventuality'. What is the difference between them? According to Lt. Col. Vernon Day (2015) who is responsible for policy, standards and research at POP: 'Crowd (unrest) refers to crowd management incidents requiring some form of police intervention such as pushing back or making arrests in order to maintain public order'. Use of tear gas, water cannon, stun grenades or rubber bullets indicates that unrest has occurred. When the Minister of Police was asked how many arrests there had been in the course of crowd management all numbers related to 'crowd (unrest)'.[16] If a case docket is opened this would be evidence of 'unrest'.[17] A spontaneous incident, even if it contravened the RGA, does not require 'intervention' if it remains peaceful. In our view, it is misleading to equate 'crowd unrest' with a violent gathering. The evidence for unrest is based on what the police do – push backs, dispersal, arresting, opening a docket etc. – rather than what protesters (or other public-event participants) do. The police are expected to maintain order, but assessments as to what constitutes a threat to order are somewhat subjective, and do not require evidence that there has already been violence (in the sense of injury to a person or damage to property).

According to Day (2015): 'Crowd peaceful refers to crowd management incidents … which require no police interventions'. Rather than 'crowd (unrest)' being seen as the opposite of 'crowd (peaceful)', thus implicitly violent (or explicitly so in the case of the Minister of Police's answer mentioned above), it is more accurate to see crowd (peaceful) as the opposite of crowd (unrest). It is not the absence of violence that defines 'peaceful', it is the absence of intervention. This evaluation accords with the *National Instruction's* approach to different levels of threat. These are conceived as follows:

Level One: A peaceful gathering and less significant sport, entertainment or social event which can be policed by members of Visible Policing at station level or the Metro Police … no threat or need for the use of force is envisaged. The POP unit must be on standby.

Level Two: Unconfirmed information regarding a possibility of a threat against lives and property. Members of Visible Policing at station level and the Metro police … must be the primary role players, with the relevant POP unit in reserve at the scene.

[16] The figures were: 2009/10 – 4,883; 2010/11 – 4,680; 1 April 2011 to 5 March 2012 – 2,967 (National Assembly 2012).

[17] Letter from Major JWJ Joubert, Commander: Operational Public Order Info Analysis and IRIS Management, to Professor Jane Duncan, 6 March 2015.

Level Three. Confirmed information regarding a likely threat to lives and property. The POP unit must take operational command.

The thinking is that Level Three situations are linked to POP intervention and could well end up as unrest incidents. Levels One and Two, where POP is on standby or reserve, should be peaceful incidents. The *Instruction* addresses the problem of 'unforeseen (spontaneous) gatherings' where threat levels cannot be determined in advance and station level Visible Policing units or Metro Police are likely to be first on the scene. It sets out a step by step approach aimed at avoiding confrontation until a POP contingent arrives, but there is one exception. 'If a national road is being blocked', states the *Instruction*, 'the road needs to be cleared first before negotiations may start'. In this situation, the incident ought to be recorded as 'unrest' even though there is no violence and no POP intervention.

The critical point is that whether an incident is defined as unrest or peaceful is determined by whether the police have intervened, not by whether there has been violence.

2.2 Distinctions: practice

In the incidents we reviewed, the distinction between crowd (peaceful) and crowd (unrest) generally holds true. However, the conflation of 'violence' and 'unrest' cannot be justified. Moreover, many incidents appear to have been wrongly classified, presumably as a consequence of poor recording and insufficient diligence by IRIS staff.

Table 1 provides examples of incidents which have been classified as peaceful. However, the example recorded as 'conflict between community and gangs' records a number of violent incidents, including what appears to be actions motivated by xenophobia resulting in someone being shot. In the other two examples, there is either evidence of arrests or of a case docket being opened. Thus, assuming that evidence of violence, arrests and dockets being opened is sufficient to qualify as an 'unrest' eventuality, these incidents were wrongly classified. Table 2 provides examples of incidents classified as unrest. As we have argued, such incidents should not be equated with violence. Indeed, none of the examples provided seems to indicate there was any violent action. Furthermore, none of these examples provide evidence of cases being opened or arrests being made.

It is therefore important that, with specific regard to peaceful/unrest, IRIS data should be interpreted with caution. Unrest cannot be equated with violence. Moreover, errors are frequent. Further research is therefore needed before any conclusions about levels of violence can be drawn, and this will form part of a subsequent report.

Table 1. Examples of incidents classified as 'peaceful'[18]

Motive	Notes
Attack on security force	ON 2012-12-22 AT ABOUT 16:00 TILL 21:00 MAKHADO POP MEMBERS UNDER W/O CHARANE MONITOR/CONTROL THE CROWD OF ± 500 PEOPLE OF TSHIKUWI/MANAME PARADISE WHO WERE GATHERED AT THE N1 NORTH OF MAKHADO TOWN WHEREBY A TRUCK OF STEVE TRANS DROPED ±100 BOXES OF SUNSTAR COOKING OIL.THE COMMUNITY MEMBERS FORCE TO LOOT/TAKE THE BOXES WITHOUT OWNERS 'S WILL AND THREW STONES TO POLICE TO GIVE THEM ACCESS TO STEAL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICE.POP MEMBERS MANAGE TO ARREST 02 A/FEMALES FOR PUBLIC VIOLANCE AND THEFT.THE SITUATION FORCED W/O CHARE TO INSTRUCT CONST:.. TO FIRE TWO SHOTS OF SHOTGUN TO THE GROUND.NO ANY INJURIES REPORTED AND CAPT… ALSO ARRIVED AT SCENE AND GIVEN THE REPORT FOR INCIDENT.ARRESTED WOMEN…THEY BOTH DETAINED AT MAKHADO SAPS FREE FROM INJURIES AS PER CAS=722/12/2012,SAP 14=261,262/12/2012.CONST… SUSTAIN MINOR INJURY ON HIS RIGHT HAND AND THE REPORT MADE W/O… AS PER OB=274/ 12/2012 OF MAKHADO POP.THE ADRESS OF THE TRUCK WHICH DROPED THE LOAD IS…AND THE TRUCK WAS FROM LOUIS TRICHARDT CASH-CARY STORE TO ZIMBABWE.POP MEMBERS MANAGE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION TILL 21:00 WHERE THE LOAD WAS RE-LOADED AND THE TRUCK WAS ESCORT TILL IT PASS THE BAOBAB TOLL GATE.OB NO.273/12/2012 IRS NO.729836 [22/12/2012, Limpopo]
Conflict between community and gangs	ON MONDAY 18,MARCH 2013 AT ABOUT 14:45 PROV-JOC CONTACTED AP1 THAT AT M/EAST TSAMAYA ROAD NEXT TO FIVE STAR THAT ±300 PEOPLE GATHERING AND LOOTING THE PAKISTAN`S SHOPS.AP99 CAPT… INFORMED ABOUT THE SITUATION,AP55,AP34 AND AP30 DISPATCHED FROM LYTTLETON TO MAMELODI GO AND MONITOR THE SITUATION. AT ABOUT 15:15 AP34 WO… REPORT THAT THEY ARRIVED AT TSAMAYA ROAD NEXT TO FIVE STAR,WERE A PAKISTAN SHOT SOMEBODY WHO WAS PASSING.IT IS ALLEGED THAT PEOPLE WERE TRYING ROB HIM.HE STARTED SHOOTING RONDOMLY,AND ONE PERSON WAS SHOT,ONE ASSAULTED BY THE COMMUNITY.THE PAKISTAN GUY WAS TAKEN TO MAMELODI EAST SAPS.AT ABOUT 15:50 AP34 REPORT THAT LT COL… INFORMED THEM THAT ONE PAKISTAN IS STIL IN THE SHOP LOADING THE STOCK TO MOVE IT AWAY.IT ALLEGED THAT FIGHT IS BETWEEN THE SOMALIANS AND THE PAKISTANS,SO IT SEEMS THE PAKISTAN SHOT SOMALIAN AND THE COMMNITY ASSAULTED THE PAKISTANS. ±300 PEOPLE GATHERRING,50% MALES AND 50% FEMALES ALL ABOVE 18 YEARS. AT 21:45 AP92 CAPT… REPORTED FROM MAMELODI EAST AT EXTENSION 16 THE SOMALIANS TCKSHOP OWNERS ARE LOADING THEIR STOCK/GROCERIES INTO VEHICLES AND MOVING THEM TO SUNNYSIDE AND PRETORIA CBD.ONE(1) PAKISTAN TUCKSHOP OWNER REFUSED TO MOVE HIS STOCK AWAY SAYING HE FEELS SAFE.THE POLICE ARE ESCORTING THEM OUT OF MAMELODI.A CASE DOCKET OF ATTEMPTED MURDER AND POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND AMMUNITION WAS REGISTERED AT MAMELODI EAST SAPS AND ONE(1) SUSPECT WAS ARRESTED.THE SITUATION IS CALM AND UNDER CONTROL.TUESDAY 2013-03-19 AT 00:05 AP36 W/O RIKHOTSO REPORTED FROM HOUSE 18606,TULIP STREET,EXTENSION 16,MAMELODI EAST THAT A TUCKSHOP WHICH BELONGS TO A PAKISTAN NATIONAL WAS BROKEN IN AND THE OWNER… WHO WAS FOUND INSIDE WAS ASSAULTED.THE SUSPECTS GAINED ENTRY BY REMOVING ONE ZINC FROM THE ROOF OF THE TUCKSHOP. NOTHING WAS STOLEN FROM THE TUCKSHOP AND INTRUDERS FLED AFTER THEY ASSAULTED THE VICTIM WHO WILL CONSULT A DOCTOR DURING THE DAY.FOUR(4) OTHER PAKISTAN NATIONALS AGREED TO SLEEP WITH THE VICTIM INSIDE THE TUCKSHOP TO PREVENT FURTHER BREAK INS.THE OWNER ALSO PROMISED TO CALL THE POLICE IMMEDIATELY SHOULD ANOTHER ATTEMPT BE MADE.THE POLICE WILL PATROL THE AREA. AT 07:00 EVERYTHING WAS QUITE. [18/03/2013, Gauteng]

[18] It should be noted that with the exception of personal details, which have been removed, the notes are presented exactly how they appear within the IRIS data supplied to us.

Motive	Notes
Dissatisfied with local government	ON 2008-01-09 BETWEEN 17:00 AND 21:00 CCU SPRINGS MEMBERS MONITORED THE SITUATION AT BARCELONA S/CAMP WHERE -+100 MEMBERS OF CONCERNED BARCELONA GROUP… WHO ARE MEMBERS OF PAC,IFP AND MKVF GATHERED AND DAMAGED 75 TOILETS AT ETWATWA EXT.34 MIG FUNDED PROJECT.A CASE WAS OPENED… (0761865225)AS PER ETWATWA SAPS CASE:79/01/2008.THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE AT ABOUT 17:00 TO 21:00.NO ARRESTS WAS MADE.THE SUSPECTS ARE KNOWN TO THE COMPLAINANT.[09/01/2008, Gauteng]

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Table 2. Examples of incidents classified as 'unrest'

Motive	Notes
Dissatisfied with local government	ON 2007-03-02 FROM 16:00 TO 19:00+-220 RESIDENTS OF VAALBANK TOGETHER WITH THE COUNCILLORS HELD A MEETING AT VAALBANK COMMUNITY HALL OVER THE SHORTAGE OF WATER SUPPLY.THE MEETING PROVED FRUITLESS DUE TO UNRULLY BEHAVIOUR OF THE PARTICIPANT,THEY GAVE THE COUNCILLOR 24 HRS TO RECTIFY THE PROBLEM OF WATER SUPPLY.THE MATTER HAS NOT YET BEEN SOLVED.CCU MEMBERS OF MIDDELBURG MONITORED THE SITUATION. [02/03/2007, Mpumalanga]
Resistance to government policy	NC41 REPORTED THAT THEY ATTENDED THE CONFLICT OVER ILLEGAL WATER CONNECTION AT EXT.04 ERASMUS.IT WAS 20 MEN NEAR STAND NO:5620….THE GROUP OF EXT.04 AND 05 REACHED AN AGREEMENT NOT TO CONNECT THAT ILLEGAL PIPE OF WATER FROM THOSE WHO HAVE LEGAL WATER PIPES.THE MATTER WAS SOLVED PEACEFUL NOTHING ILLEGAL WAS DONE
Election campaign	ON MONDAY 2011-04-04 AT ABOUT 09:00 ±1500 RESIDENTS OF THAPELONG VAN STADENSRUS WERE INVITED FOR IMBIZO AT THAPELONG HIGH SCHOOL PREMISES. THE MEC QABATHE OF CO-OPERATIVE GORVENANCE, TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN SETTLEMENT AND OTHER MINISTERS ATTENDED IMBIZO WHEREBY RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN REGARD OF BUDGET VOTE SPEECH. AT ABOUT 14:00 PARTICIPANTS DISPERSED PEACEFUL. [04/04/2011, Free State]

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

2.3 Numbers

Table 3 shows total crowd incidents per year and the split between peaceful and unrest. Figures 3 and 4 display numbers of peaceful and unrest incidents by year. The scales are different because we want to draw attention to the different patterns, and that for unrest is obscured if all data is presented in one graph.[19]

The totals reveal an early peak in 1998 – something that requires close investigation. After a drop, the total number of incidents plateaus around 7,000-8,000 per year between 2000 and 2003. It then rises steeply, peaking at nearly 11,000 in 2006. This is the year the CCUs were introduced, units disbanded and numbers of

[19] In the financial year 2013/14 there was a total of 13,575 'crowd-related incidents', of which 11,668 were recorded as 'peaceful' and 1,907 as 'unrest-related' (SAPS 2014a). According to the Minister of Police in 2014/15 there were '14,740 incidents of which 12,451 were peaceful and, 2,289 turning violent (sic)' (Nene 2015).

staff crash. The number of incidents plummets, but more sharply for ‘peaceful’ than ‘unrest’. Peaceful incidents reach a new high in 2010, the year of the World Cup, when there is extra work and more staff. Unrest incidents increase continually from 2007, rising steeply after 2010 and reaching a peak in 2012. However, the overall highpoint is in 2013, our final year, when there are nearly 13,000 incidents.

Table 3. Peaceful and unrest incidents, totals and percentages, 1997-2013

Year	Total crowd incidents	Total crowd (peaceful)	Total crowd (unrest)	Peaceful (%)	Unrest (%)
1997	6,209	5,323	886	85.7	14.3
1998	9,431	8,241	1,190	87.4	12.6
1999	8,895	8,152	743	91.6	8.4
2000	7,839	7,128	711	90.9	9.1
2001	8,104	7,471	633	92.2	7.8
2002	6,955	6,386	569	91.8	8.2
2003	7,570	7,035	535	92.9	7.1
2004	8,822	8,253	569	93.6	6.4
2005	10,412	9,473	939	91.0	9.0
2006	10,838	9,981	857	92.1	7.9
2007	7,508	6,795	713	90.5	9.5
2008	6,427	5,691	736	88.5	11.5
2009	8,759	7,872	887	89.9	10.1
2010	11,769	10,839	930	92.1	7.9
2011	12,014	10,796	1,218	89.9	10.1
2012	11,969	10,158	1,811	84.9	15.1
2013	12,709	11,010	1,699	86.6	13.4
Total	156,230	140,604	15,626	90.0	10.0

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Figure 3. Total crowd (peaceful) incidents, 1997-2013



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Figure 4 Total crowd (unrest) incidents, 1997-2013



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Turning to the proportion of crowd incidents classified as ‘unrest’, the average for the 17 years is precisely 10.0%. However, the balance shifts. The average for 1997-98 is 13.5%; for 1999-2007 it is 8.2%; and, if we exclude 2010, for 2007-13 it is 12.0%, with the highest figure, 15.1%, being recorded in 2012.

So far there are two rather obvious conclusions. The total number of crowd incidents, especially those defined as ‘peaceful’, declined rapidly after the 2006 reorganisation, and probably, in large measure, because of it, and then it rose steeply in 2010 as a consequence of the FIFA World Cup. Beyond that, one can begin to describe a pattern, but it is necessary to analyse the data in different ways in order to begin to hazard possible explanations.

3. Distribution of incidents by province

3.1 Overview

The IRIS database includes a provincial breakdown of incidents. Between 1997 and 2013 a total of 156,230 incidents are recorded for all provinces. Using the category 'eventuality classification', IRIS personnel use one of two options, namely 'crowd (peaceful)' and 'crowd (unrest)', to classify all incidents accordingly. Appendix 1 shows the provincial as well as annual distribution of all incidents recorded, showing a distinction between peaceful and unrest incidents. An overwhelming majority (90%) of these incidents are classified as 'peaceful', while only 10% of all incidents are classified as 'unrest' incidents. This pattern is consistent (albeit with some variations) for all provinces.

Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the 15,626 incidents recorded as 'unrest'. Gauteng – also the most populous province – accounted for the highest unrest percentage for all provinces. While the Western Cape recorded over 15% of the unrest incidents, the North West, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape each recorded around 12% of the incidents. Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the Northern Cape recorded the lowest percentages of unrest incidents, all under 7% each.

Figure 5. Percentage distribution of unrest incidents by province, 1997-2013



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Table 4. Unrest incidents by province, percentages, 1997-2013

Year	EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NC	NW	WC	Total
1997	16.9	14.3	16.9	20.6	4.0	3.4	2.5	11.9	9.5	100
1998	17.8	8.9	18.9	16.3	4.9	4.1	1.9	15.1	12.1	100
1999	19.7	7.5	15.0	15.2	4.5	3.5	2.1	19.2	13.3	100
2000	22.9	6.7	15.3	13.6	4.3	2.6	3.0	20.2	11.3	100
2001	21.3	7.6	15.6	16.3	7.1	2.7	2.7	16.8	9.8	100
2002	14.3	5.7	20.5	19.3	6.6	2.2	2.8	19.9	8.6	100
2003	13.8	6.2	20.3	23.2	6.2	2.4	3.1	17.2	7.7	100
2004	10.2	4.6	19.1	25.7	8.1	4.4	2.9	18.0	7.0	100
2005	12.4	6.4	18.3	23.1	8.5	4.5	4.7	15.8	6.3	100
2006	17.0	6.9	16.2	22.5	8.1	5.1	4.5	14.7	5.1	100
2007	10.6	5.9	20.8	16.7	8.9	1.8	5.8	20.0	9.7	100
2008	6.6	5.9	26.7	13.8	8.7	1.6	4.8	23.9	8.0	100
2009	5.4	5.9	25.9	21.9	8.6	3.0	4.3	19.7	5.4	100
2010	9.8	7.2	20.4	19.2	10.2	6.3	5.1	12.8	9.0	100
2011	8.7	5.7	21.6	23.2	10.3	5.1	4.4	13.3	7.7	100
2012	10.7	7.5	18.5	22.3	11.1	4.2	3.7	13.8	8.4	100
2013	12.1	7.1	21.4	22.1	8.8	3.7	2.7	12.2	9.9	100
Total	13.3	6.9	19.4	20.1	7.9	3.8	3.6	16.3	8.7	100

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

EC = Eastern Cape
FS = Free State
GP = Gauteng
KZN = KwaZulu-Natal
LP = Limpopo
MP = Mpumalanga
NC = Northern Cape
NW = North West
WC = Western Cape

Table 4 highlights unrest incidents from all provinces annually. While the trends are somewhat similar to Figure 5 (with Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and North West recording the highest percentages of unrest incidents and Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape recording the lowest), the Western Cape does not feature as prominently for individual years as in the total period.

Table 5 shows a comparison between peaceful and unrest incidents by provinces. The table highlights that within the peaceful classification, KwaZulu-Natal recorded the highest percentage in peaceful incidents, with the Northern Cape recording the lowest. Gauteng recorded the highest percentage of unrest incidents, while the Northern Cape again recorded the lowest. It must be emphasised that this does not imply that Gauteng records the most violent incidents, as this is not necessarily equated with the unrest classification (refer to section 2).

Table 5. Peaceful and unrest incidents, totals and percentages 1997-2013

Province	Crowd (peaceful)	Crowd (unrest)	Total crowd incidents
Eastern Cape	18,732	1,838	20,570
	13.3%	11.8%	13.2%
Free State	9,766	1,555	11,321
	6.9%	10.0%	7.2%
Gauteng	27,328	3,318	30,646
	19.4%	21.2%	19.6%
KwaZulu-Natal	28,213	1,895	30,108
	20.1%	12.1%	19.3%
Limpopo	11,041	917	11,958
	7.9%	5.9%	7.7%
Mpumalanga	5,319	1,005	6,324
	3.8%	6.4%	4.0%
Northern Cape	5,103	707	5,810
	3.6%	4.5%	3.7%
North West	22,911	1,979	24,890
	16.3%	12.7%	15.9%
Western Cape	12,191	2,412	146,03
	8.7%	15.4%	9.3%
Total	140,604	15,626	156,230
	100%	100%	100%

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Table 6 shows that in 1997 almost 20% of all incidents recorded (the highest percentage that year) were from the KwaZulu-Natal province. The trend did not continue however, as Gauteng took over with 18.7% in 1998, followed by the Eastern Cape with 19.5% in 1999. The North West province began to show some prominence in 1999 and 2000, dwindling in 2001 and then increasing again in 2002, accounting for over 19% of all incidents. KwaZulu-Natal dominated again from 2003-2006, accounting for a quarter of all incidents in 2004. The years 2007-2011 saw Gauteng dominating yet again, recording between 18.3% and 27.5% of all incidents. While the North West and KwaZulu-Natal provinces continued to feature quite prominently during the same period, there was a significant decrease in the number of incidents recorded in the North West from 2010 onwards. The annual trends for the Free State, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and Western Cape has been somewhat similar over the years, as they account for significantly lower incidents than the Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and North West provinces. Also, while the Eastern Cape was relatively dominant from 1997 to 2001, it dwindled significantly between the years 2002 and 2013, with some uneven peaks in between.

Table 6. Provincial distribution of all incidents (peaceful and unrest), percentages, 1997-2013

Years	EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NC	NW	WC	Total
1997	16.4	14.5	17.0	19.8	5.3	3.4	2.6	11.4	9.6	100
1998	17.6	10.2	18.7	15.4	5.2	4.3	1.8	14.4	12.2	100
1999	19.5	7.7	15.1	15.1	4.5	3.6	2.1	18.8	13.5	100
2000	22.3	7.1	15.7	13.6	4.2	2.7	3.2	19.5	11.7	100
2001	21.1	7.5	15.8	16.0	6.8	2.8	3.4	16.5	10.2	100
2002	13.9	5.6	20.3	18.7	7.1	2.4	3.3	19.6	9.1	100
2003	13.7	6.0	20.1	22.5	6.3	2.5	3.4	17.1	8.5	100
2004	9.9	5.1	19.1	25.2	8.0	4.5	3.1	17.6	7.5	100
2005	12.4	7.5	18.4	21.9	8.1	4.6	4.7	15.3	7.1	100
2006	16.5	6.9	16.9	21.8	7.7	5.4	4.2	14.3	6.2	100
2007	10.2	6.0	21.3	15.7	8.6	1.8	5.8	20.3	10.3	100
2008	6.4	6.2	27.5	13.3	8.1	1.6	4.7	23.1	9.1	100
2009	5.7	5.9	25.6	21.2	8.3	3.3	4.4	19.1	6.5	100
2010	9.5	7.4	20.6	18.6	9.9	6.9	5.1	12.7	9.3	100
2011	8.6	6.2	21.6	22.2	9.8	5.4	4.6	13.3	8.3	100
2012	11.0	7.7	18.3	20.3	10.1	5.1	3.9	14.2	9.4	100
2013	12.6	7.0	21.9	20.9	8.4	4.1	2.7	11.4	11.0	100
Total	13.2	7.2	19.6	19.3	7.7	4.0	3.7	15.9	9.3	100

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

EC = Eastern Cape
FS = Free State
GP = Gauteng
KZN = KwaZulu-Natal
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MP = Mpumalanga
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NW = North West
WC = Western Cape

3.2 Incidents related to population

Figures 6 and 7 provide data on the number of incidents per 100,000 people.[20] The likely impact of the restructuring of public order policing on the recording of incidents between 2006 and 2010 is highlighted, particularly in the recording of peaceful incidents. However, the recording of unrest incidents appears to be steady during the same period. This suggests that despite the considerable reduction in public order policing officers and the withdrawal of units from Mpumalanga the policing levels of

[20] Population figures have been taken from StatsSA mid-year population estimates.

incidents considered as unrest remained steady. Again it must be stressed that unrest cannot be equated with violence. Rather, incidents classified as unrest should be considered as mostly incidents where public order policing makes some kind of intervention to alter behaviour.

Figure 6. Crowd (peaceful) and crowd (unrest) incidents nationally per 100,000 people, 1997-2013



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Figure 7. Average number of incidents (peaceful and unrest) per 100,000 people, by province (1997-2013)



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Figure 8. Peaceful incidents per 100,000 people, nationally and selected provinces (1997-2013)



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Figure 9. Unrest incidents per 100,000 people, nationally and selected provinces (1997-2013)



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Appendix 2 provides tables which give a provincial analysis of incidents per 100,000 people. What becomes clear from this analysis is that North West has a significantly higher number of incidents per 100,000 than any other province. Figures 8 and 9 analyse the number of incidents per 100,000 people by peaceful and unrest. As Figure 8 shows, North West has a considerably higher number of peaceful incidents per 100,000 people compared to the national averages and provinces which register the highest number of incidents, Gauteng and the Western Cape. Figure 9 demonstrates that while the number of unrest incidents per 100,000 people for North West was relatively consistent with national averages between 1997 and 2006, there was a significant increase in the number of unrest incidents per 100,000 people from 2006 onwards. We believe that these figures might be explained partly by population growth, which was particularly rapid in North West, and by the related expansion in informal settlements in the province. The 2011 census revealed that North West had the highest percentage of people living in informal housing: 21.2% compared to a national average of 13.6% (StatsSA, 2012: 26). Marikana is located in North West, and there is a spike in 2012, the year of the massacre, but there was growing discontent prior to the killings.

4. Motives

4.1 Understanding and defining motives assigned by the SAPS

Incident recording personnel for the SAPS assign motives to incidents from a dropdown menu of options. Between 1997 and 2008 there were 60 options to choose from and from 2009 onwards there were 72.[21] An incident may be recorded with more than one motive, and this was the case in 10,997 incidents where multiple motives for the same incident were recorded. Therefore the number of motives analysed is greater than the number of incidents. Until 2013 it was not compulsory for incident recording personnel to assign a motive to an incident. Indeed, 56,743 (33.9%) of all the incidents recorded have been assigned the category 'no motive registered'. The implications of this for analysis shall be discussed in subsequent sections of this report.

Unfortunately, in response to our PAIA request the SAPS did not provide any information as to whether motive options have definitions, which would aid incident recording personnel in selecting motive options. Our initial analysis of the notes accompanying each incident quickly revealed that the way in which motive options have been assigned to incidents was not self-evident. For instance the motive 'attack on security force' would lead to the assumption that a member of the security forces had been attacked during the incident, but the notes demonstrate that not all of the incidents are consistent with this type of action (see Table 7 for examples). Furthermore, some of the names of the motive options, such as 'solidarity', 'in sympathy with the oppressed' and 'recapitalisation' are ambiguous in their meaning and a reading of notes failed to reveal a consistent method according to which these motive options had been applied (see Table 7 for examples as well as Appendix 4). While some of these motive options are used infrequently, 'attack on security' is used for only 0.5% of incidents recorded, and others such as 'solidarity' or 'in sympathy with the oppressed' are used for 4.3% and 1.5% of incidents respectively, making them amongst the most frequently recorded motives.

In the absence of definitions supplied by the SAPS as to the intended meaning of the motive options and the ambiguity of some of the motive option names, it has been necessary to provide approximate definitions for the motive options based upon a selected reading of the notes associated with each motive option. This also involved translating notes from Afrikaans into English to ensure there was consistency between how motives were being selected by Afrikaans- and English-medium incident recording personnel.

Due to the scale of the data, definitions have been provided only for the 28 motives that were selected more than 1% of the time, as these are the motives most consistently recorded by the SAPS. Appendix 4 provides approximate definitions for

[21] See Appendix 3.

the motives and examples of incidents recorded against these motives. Section 4.2 provides a further analysis of how the motive options have been used.

Table 7. Examples of obscure motive options

Motive option and eventuality classification	Notes
Attack on security force (Peaceful)	ON 2013-10-05 AT ABOUT 10HOO W/O… AND 07 MEMBERS MONITORED THE FUNERAL… WHO DIED DURING PROTEST MARCH IN DURBAN.THERE WAS ABOUT 350 MOURNERS WHO ATTENDED THE FUNERAL AT MHPHISE AREA KWAMAPHUMULO.ALL WENT WELL NO INCIDENT HAS BEEN REPORTED. [05/10/2013, KwaZulu-Natal] ON MONDAY 2007-11-05 MEMBERS OF RUSTENBURG CCU MONITORED A COURT PROCEEDINGS HELD AT TLHABANE MAGISTRATE COURT.±150 PEOPLE ATTENDED THE COURT PROCEEDINGS OF FIVE SUSPECTS OF HEIST OCCURED AT RUSTENGBURG SITREP:AT 09:30 THE COURT PROCEEDING STARTED ALL IN ORDER SITREP:AT 10:00 ALL IN ORDER ±150 PEOPLE ATTENDED SIREP:AT 11:00 ALL IN ORDER AT TLHABANE COURT SIREP:AT 12:00 EVERYTHING ENDED WELL AND WILL PROCEED TOMMOROW AT 09:00. [05/11/2007, North West]
In sympathy with the oppressed (peaceful)	ON THURSDAY 2013-01-24 AT 17:00 THE COUNSELOR… HELD A MEETING WITH ± 400 CONCERNED RESIDENTS AT A OPEN SPACE BY 'F' SECTION IN BOTSHABELO, AT ABOUT 17:00 THE COUNSELOR LEFT THE MEETING, BECAUSE THE RESIDENTS WAS NOT HAPPY ABOUT SOME OF THE DECISIONSTHAT WERE MADE, AND THEY BARRICADED THE RODE WITH STONES AND OBJECTS. CAPT… NEGOTIATE WITH THE GROUP AND THEY DISPERSED PEACEFULLY. THERE WAS NO CAS OPEND. [24/01/2013, Free State]. ON 2011/04/17 AT 09;00 PIOPS MEMBERS UNDER W/O… MONITOR SITUATION AT TSHISAULU WERE +-500 PEOPLE GATHRED AGAINST THE MURDER OF MR.M….THEY DEMAND THAT HIS CHILDREN… AND HIS BROTHER WHO IS A PROSECUTER BE ARRESTED OR ELSE THEY BURN THE HOUSE AND THEIR PROPERTIES.THEY MARCHED FROM THE CHIEF'S KRAAL TO WERE THE SUSPECTS RESIDES WITH THE INTENTION TO BURN THEIR HOUSE. POPS MEMBERS RESCUE THE SUSPECTS AND TRANSPORT TO SAPS T/NDOU FOR THEIR SAFETY.THE AGREEMENT WAS THAT THEY ARE GOING TO MEET ON 2011-04-20 AT 16:00.THEY DISPERSED PECEFUL WITH NO INCIDENT REPORTED DURING AND AFTER. IRIS.666353 [17/04/2011, Limpopo]
Recapitalisation (peaceful)	ON FRIDAY 2013-05-03 AT 11:00 AJ 26 WO… ,SGT…,WO… AND WO… WERE DEPLOYED TO MONITOR THE GATHERING OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW THA TOOK PLACE AT SABC AUCKLAND PARK . THE PURPOSE OF THE GATHERING IS NEED TO KNOW ALL NATIONAL KEY POINTS. AT 12:25 AJ 26 REPORTED ABOUT 20 PEOPLE GATHERED AT ARFILLERY AND CUNNERY RD IN AUCKLAND PARK. AT 13:15J 26 REPORTED THAT ALL IS IN ORDER AT AUCKLAND PARK AS ABOUT 100 CONCERNED RESIDENTS FROM SOWETO HAS JUST JOINED THE PARTICIPANTS IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM SUPPORT. AT 16:10 THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE DISPERSED WITH NO INCIDENTS OCCURED. [03/05/2013, Gauteng] ON MONDAY 2010-03-29 MEMBERS OF POP JHB INSP… OF AJ413 MONITORED A MEETING BY UNITED TAXI ASSOCIATION FORUM HELD AT HIGH COURT JOHANNESBURG 6TH FLOOR.THE MEETING CONCERNS THE FEEDBACK ABOUT THE RUMOUR THAT TAXI ROUTES WERE GOING TO BE SUSPENDED.THE MEETING WAS POSTPONED FOR THE 13TH-04-2010. NO INCIDENT REPORTED AND THE PARTICIPANT DISPERSED PEACEFULLY TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HOMES. [29/03/2010, Gauteng]

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

4.2 Analysing incident motives

4.2.1 Introduction

While recording officers have a large number of motive options from which to choose, minimal use has been made of the majority of motive options. Indeed, only 28 of the motives were used for more than 1% of incidents (excluding the 'no motive registered' option). Appendix 3 provides a list of all the motives which can be assigned to an incident and the time-span of their use. The motive 'Forcing of demands&' (sic), which accounts for 19% of all incidents recorded between 1997 and 1999, is no longer used after 1999. There are minor changes in the motive options between 1999 and 2008, demonstrated by the table provided in Appendix 3. A more significant reorganisation of the motive options appears to occur between 2008 and 2009, when the available motive options increased from 60 to 72.

Among the new motive options introduced are: 'dissatisfied with service delivery', 'dissatisfied with housing', 'xenophobia', 'vote' and 'voter registration'. The introduction of the motives 'dissatisfied with service delivery' and 'xenophobia' does not mean these kinds of incidents did not occur before 2008. Indeed, there are a number of motive options for recording the same kinds of events. For instance, prior to 2008 events which would now be assigned to the 'dissatisfied with service delivery' motive may have been recorded under any of the following motives; 'forcing of demands&' (sic), 'dissatisfied with local government', 'demand resignation of councillor' or 'service charges'. Xenophobia, prior to 2008, may have been recorded under 'ethnic conflict' or 'racial conflict', but from our analysis of the data it is also clear that a number of incidents of xenophobia may also have been assigned to the 'no motive registered' option. Similarly, the introduction of the motives 'vote' and 'voter registration' in 2008 and 2009 respectively does not mean that public order policing did not record these kinds of events prior to 2008 but that there was no motive available under which to categorise these kinds of events. The significant degree of overlap and obscure meanings in the motive options used by the police makes it difficult to undertake a coherent analysis of what incidents are about if we rely solely on the often confusing motive options used by the police.

Figure 10 shows the 10 most frequently used motive options selected for incidents between 1997 and 2013. The two most common motive options selected were 'demand wage increases' and 'labour dispute', which together accounted for 25% of all incidents where a motive was assigned. The motives 'sporting event' and 'social event' combined accounted for 10,540 (10%) of all incidents recorded with a motive. 'Dissatisfied with service delivery' was registered on 4,494 occasions, 4% of all incidents with a motive registered. As discussed above, the motive option 'forcing of demands&' (sic) was used only between 1997 and 1999. Appendix 4 provides examples of incidents recorded in this category and reveals a mixture of labour-related and community-related issues. Therefore, the number of labour-related issues is likely to be higher than is indicated in Figure 10. The motive option 'solidarity', which was the third most common, is one of the motive options in relation

to which we were unable to discern a consistent definition. As a result, the motive option 'solidarity' formed part of a sample which is discussed in further detail in section 4.3.1. As the table in Appendix 6 shows, 30% of the events classified as 'peaceful' and assigned to the 'solidarity' motive option were coded as recreational, religious or cultural events and 32% were coded as official or party political events. This means that it is likely that the number of sporting events, which would have been coded as recreational events in the sample, is likely to be higher than the totals displayed in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Most commonly assigned motive options, 1997-2013



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Table 8 provides the frequency and percentage use for all motive options used for more than 1% of incidents between 1997 and 2008 and 2009 and 2013 once the 'no motive registered' option is excluded from the analysis. Consistent with the results provided in Figure 10, between 1997 and 2008 the two most frequent motives assigned to an incident are 'demand wage increases' and 'labour dispute' (14% and 11% respectively). Recreational events also feature prominently: 3,196 (4.6%) incidents were recorded as sporting events.

By analysing the data in two different time periods, which reflects the reorganisation of the motive options discussed above, changes in the most commonly selected motive options can be observed that are not reflected in Figure 10. Between 2009 and 2013 the motive 'demand wage increases' is still the most frequently used motive, accounting for 19.1% of incidents recorded with a motive from 2009 onwards. Table 8 also shows the number of recreational events public order police record, with 17.6% of all of the incidents recorded with a motive in this period relating to 'sporting event' or 'social event'. A large proportion of this can be explained by the use of public order police during the FIFA World Cup.

Table 8. Most commonly assigned motive options, 1997 and 2008 and 2009-2013

1997-2008			2009-2013		
Motive	Frequency	Percent	Motive	Frequency	Percent
Demand Wage Increases	9,490	13.8	Demand Wage Increases	7,941	19.1
Labour Dispute	7,523	10.9	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	4,493	10.8
Solidarity	6,042	8.8	Social Event	3,997	9.6
Forcing of Demands &	5,398	7.8	Sporting Event	3,346	8.0
Sporting Event	3,196	4.6	Labour Dispute	2,530	6.1
Expanding of Powerbase	2,666	3.9	Election Campaign	1,670	4.0
Dissatisfied With High Crime rate	2,532	3.7	Establish New Structure/Org	1,320	3.2
Establish Altern Structures SOS/POL	2,391	3.5	Dissatisfied With High Crime rate	1,250	3.0
Dissatisfied With Local Government	2,292	3.3	Imbizo	1,223	2.9
Mobilising of The Masses	2,205	3.2	Solidarity	1,079	2.6
In Sympathy With Oppressed	2,049	3.0	Dissatisfied With Unemployment	863	2.1
Taxi Dispute	2,045	3.0	Dissatisfied With Housing	849	2.0
Upset Violence On Woman/Children	1,499	2.2	Funeral	844	2.0
Resistance To Government Policy	1,424	2.1	Opening/Unveiling Ceremony	618	1.5
Personality Conflict	1,338	1.9	Taxi Dispute	590	1.4
Dissatisfied With S/F Action	1,318	1.9	For/Against Bail Application	528	1.3
Service Charges	1,195	1.7	Demand Resignation of Councillors	520	1.2
Schools Conflict	1,178	1.7	Dissatisfied With Workers Dismissal	520	1.2
Ideological Conflict	984	1.4	In Sympathy With Oppressed	503	1.2
Dissatisfied With Unemployment	967	1.4	Political Intolerance	461	1.1
Intimidation	850	1.2	Schools Conflict	433	1.0
Dissatisfied With Workers Dismissal	830	1.2	Demand Release of Suspects	421	1.0
Political Intolerance	811	1.2	Vote	400	1.0
Demand Resignation of Councillors	752	1.1	Campus/ Tertiary Conflict	387	0.9

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

The second most frequently used motive option is ‘dissatisfied with service delivery’, which is used for 4,493 (10.8%) of incidents recorded with a motive between 2009 and 2013. As highlighted above, the motive option ‘dissatisfied with service delivery’ was introduced in 2008. Prior to this, similar incidents may have been recorded under ‘dissatisfied with local government’ or ‘service charges’. The multiple and overlapping motives used to record incidents makes direct comparisons before and after 2009 difficult. However, if the motive options ‘dissatisfied with local government’ and ‘service charges’ are taken together this would only account for 5% of all of the incidents recorded with a motive between 1997 and 2008. While we cannot definitively say that incidents, which are not necessarily protests, related to dissatisfaction with service delivery have increased, there is some evidence to suggest their increasing occurrence. Indeed, the fact that this motive option was introduced suggests that public order police were responding to an increasing number of these kinds of incidents. Section 4.2.3 provides a further discussion of the kinds of incidents recorded under the motive ‘dissatisfied with service delivery’.

4.2.2 Analysis of incident motives by province

Appendix 5 provides an analysis of the five most frequently used motive options for incidents by province (excluding the option no motive registered). The table is broken into two time periods (1997-2008 and 2009-2013) in order to reflect the reorganisation of the motive options. It is also organised by the eventuality classification peaceful and unrest. Table 9 provides the data on the most frequently used motive option by province by the two time periods and the eventuality classification. As Table 9 shows, across the whole time period the most commonly used motive option for incidents classified as peaceful are labour-related. The exceptions are KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape where the motives ‘solidarity’ and ‘mobilising of the masses’ are the most frequent. As detailed above, although we have been unable to provide a comprehensive definition of the motive ‘solidarity’, our sampling (see section 4.3.1 and Appendix 6) suggests that 62% of these kinds of events are either recreational, religious or cultural events or official or party political events. Similarly, the motive ‘mobilising of the masses’ is a motive we were unable to provide a clear definition of based upon its usage. The motive also made up part of the sample discussed in section 4.3.1. From the sample (see Appendix 6), 36% of these incidents were official or party political events, while 26% where related to community issues.[22] However, this is based on a small sample, so these results should be interpreted with caution. While it may appear that labour-related incidents were less frequent in KwaZulu-Natal, the Northern Cape and Mpumalanga, a closer analysis of the data provided in Appendix 5 shows that labour-related motive options all feature in the top 5 most recorded motive options for each of these provinces.

[22] Definitions of these terms are provided in Table 14 in section 4.3.1.

Table 9. Most common motive assigned to an incident, by province

	1997-2008		2009-2013	
Province	**Peaceful**	**Unrest**	**Peaceful**	**Unrest**
Eastern Cape	Demand wage increases	Forcing of demands	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	17.8	7.8	25.9	25.6
Free State	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with local government	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	11.3	8.9	16.2	30.8
Gauteng	Labour dispute	Labour dispute	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	7.0	7.7	12.5	26.9
KwaZulu-Natal	Solidarity	Taxi dispute	Social event	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	9.1	8.8	10.2	17.8
Limpopo	Demand wage increases	Forcing of demands	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	7.1	13.1	15.1	12.0
Mpumalanga	Mobilising of the masses	Forcing of demands&; taxi dispute	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	15.0	9.7	19.5	38.5
Northern Cape	Solidarity	Personality conflict	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	16.7	10.4	9.6	30.4
North West	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with local government	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	6.9	8.8	15.4	33.1
Western Cape	Labour dispute	Dissatisfied with s/f action	Demand wage increases	Dissatisfied with service delivery
%	14.1	14.6	7.3	10.9

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

The most significant change in the selection of motive option between the two time periods occurs for those incidents classified as unrest. While there is some variety among the most commonly used motive between 1997 and 2008, from 2009 onwards the most frequently recorded motive for all the provinces is 'dissatisfied with service delivery'. Again, it must be stressed that incidents recorded as 'dissatisfied with service delivery' should not automatically be assumed to be protests (see section 4.2.4). Furthermore, the data provided in Table 9 must be

interpreted with caution. As noted above, similar incidents would have been recorded under multiple motives prior to 2008. Indeed, many of them may have categorised under the motive 'forcing of demands&' (sic). One of the difficulties in analysing motive options is that as motive options are not mutually exclusive a number of different motives can be used to document the same kind of incident. This disaggregates the data, making it difficult to arrive at firm conclusions as to the most common reason for incidents. In spite of these difficulties in interpreting the data, there is evidence to support the view that there are an increasing number of incidents related to dissatisfaction with service delivery from 2009 onwards.

4.2.3 'No motive registered'

While the analysis above can provide some indication as to the kinds of incidents public order policing most frequently respond to as noted above, 34% of all incidents are simply recorded as 'no motive registered', making it difficult to conduct a comprehensive analysis. Table 10 shows the percentage of incidents recorded as 'no motive registered' by year. The table highlights that in 2002 and 2003 half of all the incidents recorded by IRIS did not have a motive recorded against them. Although it became compulsory to record a motive option in 2013, nearly a third of all incidents were still recorded as 'no motive registered'. We can infer from this that incident recording personnel may have difficulty in determining a motive for an incident. Our own experience of attempting to categorise protests for the Rebellion of the Poor database means that we are aware of the difficulties of reducing complex events to a single category. In addition, it may be that incident recording personnel are under pressure to capture data quickly and are therefore unable to spend sufficient time to choose the most appropriate motive from the large number of available options.

There also appears to be geographical variation in the frequency with which incidents are recorded as 'no motive registered, as demonstrated in Table 11. The use of 'no motive registered' was most frequent in KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo and less frequent in Mpumalanga and the Free State. In order to better understand the kinds of incidents recorded under this category a sample was selected, which will be discussed in section 4.3.1.

Table 10. Percentage of incidents recorded as 'no motive registered', 1997-2013

Year	% of incidents assigned 'no motive registered'
1997	19
1998	25
1999	39
2000	44
2001	47
2002	50
2003	50
2004	47
2005	32
2006	28
2007	26
2008	32
2009	30
2010	26
2011	34
2012	28
2013	32

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Table 11. Percentage of incidents recorded as 'no motive registered', 1997-2013, by province

Province	% of incidents recorded as no motive registered
Eastern Cape	31
Free State	20
Gauteng	35
KwaZulu-Natal	40
Limpopo	41
Mpumalanga	15
Northern Cape	25
North West	38
Western Cape	36

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

4.2.4 'Dissatisfied with service delivery'

In previous analyses of IRIS data (see Saba and Van der Merwe 2013, Duncan 2014: 125) the motive 'dissatisfied with service delivery' was conflated with the

numbers of service delivery protests. In light of the way in which the SAPS has previously released information and the complexity and confusion that has surrounded the interpretation of IRIS data, as discussed in section 1.4, this is perhaps understandable. However, from our analysis it is clear that while a large proportion of incidents registered under the 'dissatisfied with service delivery' motive will be protests, not all incidents will either be protests or protests associated with what is commonly referred to as a 'service delivery protest'. Furthermore, as discussed above, there are multiple motives under which what are understood as 'service delivery protests' can be recorded, so it would be inaccurate to use the figures from one motive alone to provide an analysis of service delivery protests. While the main focus of this report is on incidents and not protests, which will be the subject of a subsequent report, the prominence of this motive means that an analysis of its use is required.

As is shown in Table 12, example 1 is an official event or *imbizo* to discuss service delivery, which has been recorded under the motive 'dissatisfied with service delivery'. Such incidents are clearly not protests. Example 2 relates to the monitoring of a crowd outside a court, which does not seem to have a direct link to a service delivery protest or with a grievance around service delivery. It is of course possible that this incident has been recorded in error; however, as discussed in section 1.5, errors made in the capturing of incidents at unit level should, theoretically, be identified by central IRIS staff and amended. Example 3 demonstrates that, as discussed in section 2.1, marches that take place which have not followed the procedures set out in the Regulation of Gatherings Act (1993) are not classified as unrest unless the police make an intervention. In example 3 the police do not intervene and therefore the incident is classified as peaceful. The final example, example 4, a march by the Deaf Federation of Mpumalanga, demonstrates that the police do not apply a narrow definition of what constitutes 'dissatisfaction with service delivery'. Therefore the kinds of concerns raised around unemployment are considered by public order policing to be a service-delivery-related issue.

From our provisional analysis of unrest incidents registered as 'dissatisfied with service delivery' it is clear that a much higher proportion of these incidents are likely to be protests. However, as was argued in section 2.2, the classification as 'unrest' should not be conflated with an understanding of these incidents as violent. Example 1 in Table 13, where police monitored a planned electricity disconnection, highlights what the research team have observed elsewhere in the data, which is the frequency with which public order police are involved in the monitoring of electricity disconnections and evictions. From the notes provided by this example, although a crowd gathered there is no definitive evidence of a protest, such as an attempt to barricade the road. While the disconnection had to be halted, perhaps due to resistance by the community, this is not stated clearly in the notes. In fact the only reference made to the behaviour of the crowd is that the 'crowd dispersed at 12.00 quietly'. From the notes, there is no clear evidence that the crowd acted in a disruptive or violent manner; indeed, the notes give the impression that there was little disruption other than the halting of the disconnection for reasons which are

unclear. Example 2 provides further evidence of the wide interpretation that SAPS applies to the understanding of ‘service delivery’.

Table 12. Examples of incidents recorded as 'dissatisfied with service delivery' (peaceful)

Example 1	SIXTEEN (16) POP MEMBERS MTHATHA DEPLOYED AT LUSIKISIKI MONITORED THE VISIT BY DEPUTY STATE PRESIDENT(KGHALEMA MONTHLANTE) AT LUTSHAYA A/A LUSIKISIKI.HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE DELEGATION FROM DEPT. OF EDUCATION BASIC FOUNDATIONPHASE. EASTERN CAPE PREMIER NOXOLO KIVIET WAS ALSO PRESENT.THE VISIT WAS ABOUT THE SERVICE DRLIVERY.THE EVENT STARTED AT 10:00 AND ENDED PEACEFULLY AT 14:00 NO SERIOUS INCIDENTS REPORTED.POP SAP10 783/01/2013. [16/01/2013, Eastern Cape]
Example 2	ON 2012-07-09 AT AROUND 09:20 THE FOLLOWING PRISONERS ARRIVED AT THE MAGISTRATE COURT IN BOTSHABELO: 29 FROM KROONSTAD AND 30 FROM GROOTVLEI, THERE WAS NO SUPPORTERS AT THIS STAGE. AT AROUND 10:10 THE SUPPORTERS STARTED TO GATHER AND LATER ON IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE ACCUSED WAS GRANTED FREE BAIL AND IS EXPECTED TO APEAR IN COURT ON THE 17 AND 18 OF SEPTEMBER.THERE WAS +- 150 SUPPORTERS AND LATER ON THE NUMBER DECREASED TO +-30 PARTICIPANTS. AT AROUND 13:00 THE PARTICIPANTS DISPERSED PEACEFULLY WITHOUT ANY INCIDENTS.ALL WAS In ORDER. [09/07/2012, Free State]
Example 3	ON 2011-02-26 AT ABOUT 09:00 TILL 11:00 THE CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF RABIE-RIDGE WILL BE HAVING A MARCH PROTEST TO THE POLICE STATION.± 700 PEOPLE ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE DURING THE EVENT.NO APPLICATION HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT.THE PARTICIPANTS WILL BE EMBARKING ON AN ILLEGAL MARCH AND WILL BE CONTRAVENING THE REGULATION OF THE GATHERINGS ACT 205 OF 1993. PARTICIPANTS WILL GATHER 09:00 AT THE OPEN SPACE NEAR THE OLD PHOMOLONG CLINIC NEXT TO THE TAXI RANK AND WILL PROCEED TO THE SAPS WHERE THE MEMORANDUM WILL BE HANDED.L/COL KHUMALO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE EVENT.COMMUNITY IS COMPLAINING OF THE SAPS FAILURE TO COMBAT CRIME IN AREA ,CONTINUOS MURDERCASES AND CORRUPTION. [26/02/2011, Gauteng]
Example 4	ON 2010-09-30 AT 08:00 KWAMHLANGA POP WERE ON DUTY TO MONITOR THE MARCH OF DEAF FEDERATION OF MPUMALANGA TO EMALAHLENI MUNICIPALITY IN WITBANK. CAPT… AND PLATOON 04 WERE MONITORING THE SITUATION. AT 09:00 +-160 PARTICIPANTS GATHERED AT SMD PARKING. AT 10:00 THE PARTICIPANTS START TO MOVE FROM INITIAL POINT TO WITBANK CIVIC CENTRE VIA MANDELA DRIVE. AT 10:30 THE PARTICIPANTS ARRIVED AT THE CIVIC CENTRE WHERE THEY WILL BE HANDING THEIR MEMORANDUM. AT 10:40 THE MEMORANDUM OF DEMANDS WAS HANDED OVER TO EMALAHLENI MUNICIPALITY REPRESENTATIVE... PARTICIPANTS COMPLAIN THAT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DOES NOT RECOGNISE THEM. THEY NEED JOB OPPORTUNITIES.THEY DEMAND THE BENEFITS THAT ARE ENTITLED FOR AS DEAFS. AT 11:00 THE PARTICIPANTS MOVED FROM CIVIC CENTRE TO KWAGUQA WHERE THEY WILL BE DISPERSING. AT 12:30 THE PARTICIPANTS DISPERSED PEACEFULLY AND NO OTHER ICIDENTS WERE REPORTED. [30/09/2010, Mpumalanga]

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Table 13. Examples of incidents recorded as 'dissatisfied with service delivery' (unrest)

Example 1	ON 2010-11-24 BETWEEN 08:00 AND 12:00, HAD AN OPERATION AT UMZINTO TO DISCONNECT ELECTRICITY CONNECTED ILLEGALLY. -+300 PEOPLE FROM THE INFORMAL SETTLEMENT GATHERED AGAIST THE DISCONNECTION. THE OPERATION HAD TO STOP SINCE THERE WAS NO CASE OPENED AGAINST THEM. THE DISCONNECTION WAS GOING TO BE DONE BY ESCOM. THE CROWD DISPERSED AT 12:00 QUIETLY.STRENGTH: 6X POP PERSONNEL 1X SOFT TOP POP 11X UMDONI MUNICIPAL STAFF 3X SOFT TOP UMDONI 5X PERSONNEL UMZINTO 1X SAPS SOFT TOP [24/11/2010, KwaZulu-Natal]
Example 2	ON TUESDAY 2009-08-11 AT 18:00 MEMBERS OF LEHURUTSHE CRIME PREVENTION MONITORED A GROUP OF ± 125 RESIDENTS OF NTSWELETSOKU WHO BARRICADED THE MAIN ROAD OF NTSWELETSOKU TO ZEERUST COMPLAINING OF MISSING PERSON… WHO IS MENTALLY RETARDED .18:05 SITREP RESIDENTS BLOCKED THE ROADS AFTER THE MEETING AT THE SPORTS GROUND OF NTSWELETSOKU. 19:00 SITREP RESIDENTS STILL BLOCKING THE ROAD. 19:50 SITREP LEHURUTSHE CRIME PREVENTION DISPERSED RESIDENTS PEACEFULLY AS THE STONES THAT WERE USED TO BLOCK THE ROAD WAS SMALL. [11/08/2009, North West]

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

4.3 Aggregated motive option analysis

The large number of motives which are seldom used, there is inconsistency with how motive options are used and the frequency with which incidents are assigned to the 'no motive registered' option make it difficult to provide a comprehensive assessment of the kinds of incidents documented by IRIS. As has been stated above, IRIS documents many different kinds of incidents, only some of which are protests. In order to provide a more comprehensive and systematic analysis of the incident motive options documented within IRIS, in the analysis that follows the motive options have been aggregated into one of 10 categories.

Table 14 provides a list of the 10 categories, their definitions and some examples of typical incidents. The categories chosen have been determined inductively from the data and by our sense of scholarly and public interest in the data. For instance, the decision to create the category 'transport-related' arose from the number of incidents that were related to a range of transport issues, including taxi disputes. The category 'xenophobia and racism' was included because of scholarly and public interest in these kinds of incidents, although they account for a low percentage of the overall number of incidents recorded within IRIS. Other researchers may prefer to aggregate motive options in different way, if at all.

Appendix 7 provides information as to how motive options were assigned to each of the aggregated motive categories. Many of the incident motives could be placed into one of the 10 categories relatively easily. For instance, the motives

'demand dismissal of employee', 'demand wage increases' and 'labour dispute' could

Table 14. Aggregate motive categories with definitions

Aggregate motive category	**Definition**	**Examples of incidents**
Community-related issues	Incidents where a geographically defined community raises an issue of concern, excluding issues of education, crime, transport or xenophobia	Community meetings, marches, protests
Labour-related	Incidents related to labour-related issues	Meetings, pickets and strike-related actions
Education-related	Incidents related to any form of education-related issue including tertiary-related education issues	Community meetings, official Department of Education events, marches, protests
Official government and party political events	Incidents related to official government or party political events	Official government events, imbizos, party political rallies, door-to-door party political campaigns
Recreational, cultural or religious events	Incidents related to sporting, musical, religious and other recreational or cultural events	Soccer matches, music concerts, funerals, cultural events
Crime and policing related	Incidents related to issues of crime and crime-related policing	Monitoring of court appearances, community meetings about crime, and protests about crime
Transport-related	Incidents related to any form of transport	Taxi disputes, monitoring of crowds at train stations, meetings regarding transport issues, protests about transport
Elections	Incidents related to any form of election	Monitoring internal political party elections, monitoring local elections, monitoring national elections
Racism and xenophobia	Incidents related to racism or xenophobia	Incidents with a racial or xenophobic orientation
Other	Incidents which cannot be classified under one of the categories above	Miscellaneous

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

all be placed into the labour category. However, as discussed above, for a number of motives it was difficult to ascertain a consistent way in which incident reporting personnel had applied certain motive options. In cases where the motive accounted for less than 1% of incidents these have been placed into the 'other' category for the purposes of this analysis. While it would have been desirable to attempt to provide comprehensive definitions for all the motive options, time constraints in analysing the data meant this approach could not be adopted. Furthermore, the minimal use of

these categories meant they would not impact on the overall analysis to a significant degree. However, with four motives, ‘establish alternative structures SOS/POL’, ‘in sympathy with the oppressed’, ‘mobilising of the masses’ and ‘solidarity’, this approach could not be taken, as they accounted for more than 1% of the total incidents recorded. It was therefore necessary to create a sample of these four motives in order to better understand the kinds of incidents that were being recorded.

4.3.1 Sampling unclear motive options

The 4 motives ‘establish alternative structures SOS/POL’, ‘in sympathy with the oppressed’, ‘mobilising of the masses’ and ‘solidarity’ were grouped together and named the unassigned motive group. In order to sample the unassigned motive and provide an accurate assessment of the kinds of incidents contained within this group a combination of disproportionate and proportionate stratified random sampling was used to obtain a representative sample of the kinds of incidents contained within the unassigned motive group. Strata were type of incident (either peaceful or unrest) and year. For type of incident, sampling was disproportionate and unrest cases were deliberately oversampled. As seen in section 2.3, for the period being considered 90.0% of all incidents recorded were peaceful, and a sample that mirrored this distribution would generate too few unrest cases per year to reliably infer the results to the population. For this reason a sampling ratio of 60% peaceful to 40% unrest was used. Proportional sampling was used for year. A final sample size of 350, 210 peaceful and 140 unrest, was deemed to be operationally feasible, incidents were grouped by type and year, and the random sampling programme in IBM SPSS (version 22) was used to draw the required sample size per stratum. Each incident was categorised into one of the 10 categories. The results of this sampling are presented in Table 15, with further details provided in Appendix 6.

Table 15. Unassigned motive sample by aggregated motive categories

	Community Related	Labour Related	Education Related	Official Government and Party Political Events	Recreational Religous and Cultural Events	Crime Related	Transport Related	Election Related	Xenophobia and Racism	Other	
Peaceful	35	17	4	64	42	16	1	11	1	19	210
%	17%	8%	2%	31%	20%	8%	1%	5%	1%	9%	100%
Unrest	43	17	13	6	3	39	4	1	2	12	140
%	31%	12%	9%	4%	2%	28%	3%	1%	1%	9%	100%

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

The sampling revealed differences as to how the unassigned motives had been categorised into one of the aggregated motive options. In the peaceful sample, 51% of the incidents ‘official government and party political events’ or ‘recreational, religious and cultural events’. With the unrest eventuality classification only 6% of incidents were in the same categories. Incidents in this category include official party political rallies, soccer matches and church services. 31% of the incidents sampled in the unrest eventuality classification were considered to be ‘community-related’,

compared to 17% of incidents in the peaceful classification. Furthermore, 28% of incidents sampled in the unrest eventuality classification were 'crime- related', compared to only 8% of those sampled in the peaceful eventuality classification.

A similar procedure was followed for incidents that had been assigned to the 'no motive registered' option. As Table 16 demonstrates, differences between incidents sampled in the peaceful and unrest eventuality classifications were also observed. 53% of incidents sampled within the peaceful eventuality classification were categorised as being 'official government and party political events' or as 'recreational, religious or cultural events', compared to 8% of those sampled in the unrest eventuality classification. 34% of incidents were categorised as 'crime-related' in the unrest sample compared to 8% in the peaceful sample. 'Community-related' incidents were also more frequently recorded in the unrest sample, with 24% categorised as 'community-related' compared to 15% in the peaceful sample. The results from the sample raise important questions and concerns about the recording of IRIS incidents. Many of the incidents recorded as 'no motive registered' should, theoretically, have been relatively easy to assign given the high proportion of official and recreational events that were found within the sample, and it is unclear why such incidents have not been assigned motives.

Table 16. 'No motive registered' sample by aggregated motive categories

	Community Related	Labour Related	Education Related	Official Government and Party Political Events	Recreational religous and cultural events	Crime Related	Transport Related	Elections	Xenophobia & Racism	Other	Total
Peaceful	32	15	2	44	68	16	3	5	0	25	210
%	15%	7%	1%	21%	32%	8%	1%	2%	0%	12%	100%
Unrest	33	11	9	2	9	48	10	0	0	18	140
%	24%	8%	7%	1%	7%	34%	7%	0%	0%	13%	100%

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

With the results from the sampling we were able to calculate estimates of the frequency of aggregated motive options. Using the recode function in IBM SPSS (version 22) motives were assigned numerical codes based on the categories motives had been assigned to (see Appendix 7). The results from the unassigned motive and 'no motive registered' samples allowed us to assign incidents proportionally to aggregated motive categories by year and eventuality classification.

4.4 Summary of key results from aggregated motive analysis

4.4.1 Aggregated analysis by peaceful and unrest incidents

Appendix 8 provides the comprehensive results from the aggregated motive analysis. The analysis presented below provides a summary of the key trends. It should be noted that all the figures presented below are estimates. Figure 11 demonstrates that the majority of peaceful incidents documented by IRIS are either labour-related or recreational, cultural or religious events. The peak documented in

2010 can be explained by the FIFA World Cup and the 2010 public sector workers' strike, which in terms of 'days lost' was the largest in South African history.

Figure 12 shows that from 1998 onwards there is a decrease in incidents related to community issues and labour issues classified as unrest, with a period of

Figure 11. Estimated selected aggregate motive categories (peaceful), 1997-2013



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

Figure 12. Estimated selected aggregate motive categories (unrest), 1997-2013



Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

plateau between 1999 and 2004. As we would expect, recreational, religious or cultural events make up a low number of incidents classified as unrest. From 2004 onwards there is a noticeable increase in the number of incidents related to community issues. While these figures cannot be equated with protest the follow similar trends documented in the Rebellion of the Poor database. Further analysis needs to be conducted to determine how many of these incidents may have been protests, and this will be the subject of a subsequent research report. Figure 12 also shows there has been a steady increase in the number of labour-related incidents classified as unrest, with a peak in 2012. One may conjecture that this was related to strike action in the mining sector, mostly the platinum belt, as well as the farm workers' strike.

4.4.2 Aggregated motive option analysis by province

As discussed above, the number of motives which can be used to classify similar kinds of events as well as the high number of incidents recorded as 'no motive registered' make it difficult to draw firm conclusions as to the most common reason for incidents recorded by IRIS. While the analysis provided in section 4.2 can provide some indication, a more reliable assessment can be provided through an analysis of the aggregated motive options. Appendix 9 provides a provincial analysis of the aggregated motives by both peaceful and unrest eventuality classifications.

Despite the concerns about the reliability of an analysis of motive options only, what the figures provided in Appendix 9 demonstrate is the degree of similarity between the most frequent motive options selected by province and the aggregated motive analysis. The highest proportion of events classified as peaceful were labour-related, with the exception of KwaZulu-Natal, where recreational, cultural and religious events made up of 20% of events classified as peaceful within the province. Similar to Table 9, the highest proportion of events classified as unrest were related to community issues for all provinces apart from Limpopo and the Western Cape, where 21% and 34% of incidents were related to crime-related issues respectively. In the case of the Western Cape one could link the higher proportion of crime and policing-related incidents to gang violence; however, a further analysis of the data would be required to confirm this hypothesis. What becomes clear from this analysis is that labour-related issues dominate incidents classified as peaceful, and community issues make up a large proportion of incidents classified as unrest. While it is important to remember the figures provided for community issues should not be conflated with numbers of community protests, the data confirms trends evident in the Rebellion of the Poor database.

4.5 Conclusion

This section has provided an analysis of the motive option used in IRIS. A summary of the key findings from this analysis is presented below.

- Over a third of all incidents are not assigned a motive. This compromises the ability of the SAPS and the public to be reliably informed about the kinds of incidents public order policing is involved in.
- The purpose of motive options is often unclear, and multiple motives can be used to categorise the same kinds of events.
- Labour-related incidents are the most common incidents public order policing records.
- Recreational, religious and cultural events and official government and party political events also take up a large proportion of the incidents recorded by public order policing.
- A large proportion of unrest incidents are related to 'community-related' issue. This trend appears to have been increasing since 2004. However, the increasing number of community-related incidents should not be conflated with protest.

5. Residentials

'Residential' refers to the place where an incident occurred. Appendix 10 presents information on the most frequently recorded residentials by province. Table 17 provides information on 20 most frequently recorded residentials nationally. The list includes metro cities (Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, East London and Bloemfonetin), provincial capitals (e.g. Polokwane), other sizeable cities (Rustenburg, the commercial centre of North West, being the most significant), major towns located at the heart of former homelands (e.g. Thohoyandou) and some 'rural towns' with densely populated hinterlands (e.g. Lusikisiki).

Table 17. 20 most frequently used residentials, 1997-2013

Residential	Province	Frequency
Bloemfontein	Free State	3,814
Pretoria	Gauteng	3,652
Rustenburg	North West	3,073
Durban	KwaZulu-Natal	3,026
Johannesburg	Gauteng	3,018
Cape Town	Gauteng	2,414
Pietermaritzburg	KwaZulu-Natal	2,143
Mthatha	Eastern Cape	1,734
Kimberley	Northern Cape	1.662
Thohoyandou	Limpopo	1,631
Mmabatho	North West	1,512
Polokwane	Limpopo	1,439
Potchefstroom	North West	1,409
Lusikisiki	Eastern Cape	1,257
Umlazi (Durban)	KwaZulu-Natal	1,174
East London	Eastern Cape	1,120
Port Elizabeth	Eastern Cape	1,073
Klerksdorp	North West	1,059
Mahikeng	North West	944
Botshabelo	Free State	913

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

There is one obvious absentee: Ekurhuleni, the fourth most populous metropolitan area. This points to a problem of reading too much into the data on ‘residentials’. Unlike the other seven metros, Ekurhuleni has no major city at its heart; rather it is a collection of former industrial towns collectively known as the East Rand. The boundaries of ‘residentials’ are not determined in consistent fashion. ‘Johannesburg’, for instance, should not be confused with the area covered by the City of Johannesburg. To make matters worse, an incident occurring in a particular place could sometimes be placed under more than one ‘residential’. For instance, events occurring in Zandspruit, an informal settlement outside of Johannesburg, are recorded both as ‘Zandspruit (Squatters Camp)’ and as ‘Honeydew’, the police precinct into which Zandspruit falls.

For Port Elizabeth we found 38 different residentials that had been linked with either ‘Port Elizabeth’ or ‘PE’. These ranged from KwaMagxaki, which recorded only two incidents, through Despatch with 151 incidents and Central with 345, to Korsten with 444 and New Brighton with 447. Smaller towns are less likely to be sub-divided into smaller geographical areas and are therefore likely to feature more prominently if a simple frequency analysis is run on a ‘residential’ name without taking into account the different ways in which an area could be recorded. While Port Elizabeth features only 1,073 times in Table 17, if all areas that fall under Port Elizabeth or PE are aggregated the total number of incidents recorded for the city increases to 5,722, a figure higher than for Bloemfontein, which appears at the top of Table 17. Thus it is important that the frequencies provided in Table 17 and Appendix 10 are interpreted with caution and not read as the total number of incidents for any one particular area.

Further research should place ‘residentials’ within their particular municipality. This could pave the way to quantitative analysis linking IRIS data to a range of demographic, economic, social and political variables that exit for municipalities. We lacked the resources to take this step at this stage. When IRIS is reformed or replaced, we recommend that a category for municipality be introduced.

6. Environmentals

'Environmental' refers to the particular environment where an incident occurred. The police are provided with a dropdown list of 74 options (see Appendix 11). Of these only 23 were used to describe more than 1% of all the incidents. These are listed in Table 18.

Table 18. 23 most common environmentals 1997-2013

Environmental	Frequency	Percent
Public Road	21,833	13.1
Sports Stadium	20,825	12.5
Residential Area	19,935	11.9
Community Hall	9,247	5.5
Industrial Area	9,010	5.4
School Premises	8,814	5.3
Courthouse	6,344	3.8
Public Building	6,195	3.7
City Hall/Town Hall	5,189	3.1
Shopping Centre	4,792	2.9
Public Service Building	4,334	2.6
Private Building	4,047	2.4
Mining Property	3,406	2.0
Hospital/Clinic	2,653	1.6
Tribal Area	2,641	1.6
Kraal	2,505	1.5
Park	2,374	1.4
Police Station/Property	2,311	1.4
Hotel/Motel	2,157	1.3
Taxi Rank	2,006	1.2
Squatter Camp	1,879	1.1
Church	1,877	1.1
University	1,844	1.1

Source: South African Research Chair in Social Change

We should not be surprised by the predominance of public spaces of various kinds in this list. Public order policing is strongly influenced by the RGA, which

focuses on ‘public places and premises wholly or partly open to the air’. ’Public roads’ are used for activities such as fun runs as well demonstrations and road blockades. ‘Sports stadiums’ are used for large public meetings and big musical and state events as well as sports. ‘Residential areas’ and ‘squatter camps’ (informal settlements) are common sites of community protests. A large number of the ‘industrial areas’ and ‘mining properties’ would be linked to labour action. Most other ‘residentials’ could be associated with a range of ‘motives’: recreational as well as political. ‘Tribal areas’ and ‘kraals’ are reminders that incidents occur in rural as well as urban areas.

Closer analysis could yield dynamics we have not yet seen. It might, for instance, be possible to discern patterns about where different kinds of protests occur. But, for us, ‘environmentals’ reflected what we knew about incidents based on our analysis of motives.

7. Conclusions

This report has offered an analysis of incidents recorded by IRIS. The main focus of this report has been to understand incidents, not protests, recorded as either ‘crowd (peaceful)’ or ‘crowd (unrest)’.

7.1 Complexity and caution in interpreting IRIS data

This report has highlighted the complexity of IRIS data and the need for caution in any analysis derived from it. Of primary importance is that IRIS does not capture all gatherings or public events. This is particularly apparent in the collapse in the number of incidents captured by IRIS following the 2006 re-organisation of public order policing.

7.1.1 Peaceful and unrest incidents

The data presented in this report shows clearly that 90% of incidents registered by IRIS between 1997 and 2013 were, in IRIS’s terms, peaceful. One of the significant contributions this report has made to deepening the understanding of IRIS data has been to provide clarity on the distinction between ‘peaceful’ and ‘unrest’. In our view, it is misleading to equate peaceful and unrest with peaceful and violent incidents. ‘Unrest’ relates to some form of police intervention aimed at changing the behaviour of participants in a public event, such as dispersal or arrests. That is, the definition is based primarily on action taken by the police, rather than by people involved in the event. Violence as such is not a condition for an incident to be defined as ‘unrest’, and it is clear from the unrest incidents we have examined that there is no evidence of violence in many cases. IRIS’s ‘peaceful' category should be regarded as a technical alternative to ‘unrest’, as, in our view, many ‘unrest’ incidents would be regarded as ‘peaceful’ by most observers. Moreover, even within this understanding of the peaceful/unrest distinction, many errors appear have been made in the recording of incidents. Therefore, ‘unrest’ cannot be equated with ‘violent’.

7.1.2 Provincial distribution

An analysis of incidents per 100,000 people has highlighted that the North West province has an exceptionally high number of incidents, especially ‘peaceful incidents’.

7.2 Motives

With peaceful incidents the largest group of motives is ‘labour-related’ – either ‘demand wage increase’ or ‘labour dispute’. This represents 25% of the total. From 2009 onwards the most common motive for unrest incidents is ‘dissatisfied with service delivery’. However, this report has highlighted the difficulties in analysing the motives used by IRIS. First, the meaning and purpose of motive options is often unclear, with multiple motives being used to categorise the same kinds of incidents. Furthermore, over a third of all incidents are not assigned a motive (32% as recently

as 2013). This compromises the ability of the SAPS and the public to understand the kinds of incidents public order policing is involved in.

In order to overcome the problems identified above, in this report we categorised motives into one of 10 motive groups. This analysis confirmed what had been indicated by the analysis of motive options, which is that the majority of peaceful incidents were labour-related (24%) with recreational, religious and cultural events a close second (21%). The majority of unrest incidents, 27%, were related to community issues. Unrest in community-related incidents appears to have been increasing since 2004. While this should not be conflated with protest, it does show similar trends to those documented in the Rebellion of the Poor database.

7.3 Recommendations and future research

We believe that an effective, reliable and accurate system of recording incidents is critical for public accountability. Clear definitions of categories and options are required. These should be aligned with concerns to measure protest action that exist within the police and among politicians and the public.

We also believe that there are a number of important avenues for future research. (1) Further inquiry as to how incidents are defined, recorded and categorised. This would require co-operation from the SAPS. (2) Further analysis of notes that accompany entries for each incident, including distinguishing which incidents are protests. (3) Analysis relating police-recorded protests to media-reported protests, and quantitative analysis linking protests with social and demographic variables (e.g. unemployment).

8. Addendum: Misinformation from generals and minister

The longer we worked on this report the more it became clear that top South African Police Service (SAPS) officials and government ministers misconstrued IRIS data and in consequence misled parliament and the public. This is significant because their interpretations were central to motivations for a massive increase in expenditure on public order policing. Before we provide evidence of their misreading, and specify the implications, we provide a reminder of some key terms used by IRIS, the source of statistics on crowd management. We hope that our analysis will spur public debate about protests and public order policing - that is its purpose.

8.1 Relevant findings from our research

1) The *Annual Report* of SAPS reveals the number of 'crowd-related incidents' that occurred in the relevant financial year. These figures correspond to those for 'crowd management incidents' and are derived from IRIS (though the numbers are not precisely the same).
2) 'Crowd management incidents' are not 'protests'. IRIS includes a list of 23 incident 'types', some of which, such as 'Demonstration' or 'Strike (Stay-Away)', could be regarded as protests, but some are clearly not protests, for example 'Assembly (Church)' and 'Assembly (Sport)'.
3) In a subsequent report we will provide an estimate of the proportion of crowd management incidents that can be regarded as protests. For now, it must suffice to note that between 1997 and 2013 about 16% of incidents were 'recreational, cultural or religious events' and about 9% were 'official events'.
4) The *Annual Report* of SAPS includes numbers for (i) 'Peaceful incidents' and (ii) 'Unrest-related incidents'. These figures correspond to those for 'Crowd (peaceful) and 'Crowd (unrest)' found in IRIS (though the numbers are not precisely the same). The term 'violent' does not appear in the *Annual Report* or in IRIS statistics.
5) 'Crowd (unrest)' cannot be equated with 'violent'. Though 'violent' is an antonym for 'peaceful', which may mislead some people, it is not a 'synonym' for violent. 'Crowd (unrest)' refers to crowd management incidents where Public Order Police (POP) intervene. Assuming rules are followed, interventions occur when life or property is endangered or if a national road is blocked. That is, actual violence by protesters is not a precondition for an incident to be recorded as 'unrest'
6) In our subsequent report, we provide an estimate of the proportion of protests involving violence. Here it must suffice to note that (i) in many cases the IRIS records provide no evidence of violence in unrest incidents, and (ii) again, recreational, cultural, religious, and official events sometimes appear under 'crowd (unrest)'.

7) With ‘peaceful’ incidents, i.e. the overwhelming majority of crowd incidents, public order policing is either on standby or in reserve, and SAPS station police or metro police take primary responsibility. Contrariwise, much (perhaps most) POP work involves duties other than crowd management. This includes activities that have proved far more costly in terms of loss or life than the policing of protest.

8.2 Abuse of IRIS statistics

We turn now to recent examples of IRIS statistics being misused by the SAPS leadership and ministers, including the President.

8.2.1. SAPS generals

On 3 September 2014 General Phiyega, the National Police Commissioner, and Lt. General Elias Mawela, the divisional commissioner responsible for POP, briefed parliament’s portfolio committee about the state of public order policing in South Africa. In the course of his presentation Mawela (2014) states:

> Violent protest action escalated from 1,226 in 2011/12, and then in 2012/13 it is 1,882, and in the last financial year [2013/14] it escalated to 1,907.[23]

Here there is conflation between ‘unrest-related incidents’ and ‘violent protests’ which are not the same. From our analysis we have demonstrated that not all incidents classified as unrest are violent. In analysis conducted for a forthcoming research report on protests, we found that only 54% of protests sampled were violent. Thus the numbers of incidents in which violence occurred is likely to be far less than he stated.

Phiyega informed the committee that in order to deal with ‘increasing and continual violent protest actions’, SAPS would be spending an extra R3.3 billion per annum on POP (SAPS 2014c).[24] Thus far, R2.7 billion had been set aside, so this expanded the budget by 122%. Phiyega later added that she would be looking for an extra 30% on top of the R3.3 billion (Portfolio Committee on Police 2014). Misrepresentation of numbers was central to justifying massively increased spending.[25]

[23] This quote is taken directly from a recording of Mawela’s statement. We are grateful to Monique Doyle for providing the link to this recording and also a copy of a written abbreviated record of proceedings (Portfolio Committee on Police 2014).

[24] The additional funds will be used to increase the strength of POP units from 4,721 members to 9,522 members over the space of four years, and to purchase water cannon, pyrotechnics (tear gas and stun grenades) and video equipment (SAPS 2014bc

[25] Mawela informed the committee that increased spending was in line with the President’s 2013 State of the Nation Address - made in the wake of the Marikana Massacre (Portfolio Committee on Police 2014).

8.2.2 The President

In his State of the Nation Address given on 12 February 2015, President Jacob Zuma (2015) said:

> We are a democratic state and recognise the community's right to protest. We however appeal that these protests should be within the ambit of the law and must be peaceful as stated in the Constitution. The police successfully brought under control 13,575 recorded public order incidents, comprising 1,907 unrest-related and 11,668 peaceful incidents.

Zuma moves from 'protests' to 'incidents' without indicating that these are different things, thus leaving his audience with the impression that they are probably the same. He then gives the total for crowd-related incidents, praising the police for bringing these 'under control', but 86% of these were 'peaceful', events like football matches, religious events and self-marshalled protests, which did not need to be - and, by definition, were not - 'brought under control'. While his statement is framed by reference to democratic rights, he ends by saying, in effect, that protests - all protests - must be limited by police intervention. His choice of the word 'control' is especially interesting, because it was a concept used under apartheid but replaced by a philosophy of 'crowd management' after the transition

Reflecting on the same passage, Jane Duncan (2015) asks: 'why, then, does the President make the dramatic claim that these gatherings were "brought under control" by the police?' She responds: 'Arguably, the President and the police have a vested interest in talking up the figures, to justify a massive expansion in the number of public order police'. We agree with this assessment.[26]

8.2.3 Minister of Police

On 15 May 2015 it was the turn of Nkosinathi Nhleko (2015) to give his budget vote speech to Parliament. In this he asserts:

> The country has witnessed a spike in service delivery and or community protests for service delivery. Police resources were committed to 14,740 incidents, of which 12,451 were peaceful and 2,289 turning violent [sic]. The fact of the matter is that these protests continue to strain the resources of the SAPS.

His mention of 'these protests' can be nothing other than a reference to the '14,740 incidents', of which, he claimed, '2,289 tuned violent'. Nhleko is the Minister of Police, so must surely know that an 'incident' is not a 'protest' and that 'unrest' is not

[26] See also the budget speech given by Nhlanhla Nene (2015), the Minister of Finance

‘violence’, so it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he was not misinforming parliament, doing so to ensure that he received support for his budget vote.

8.3 Implications

Public order police do face violence in their jobs, but the worst of this is not associated with protests, it has come mainly from interventions in taxi conflicts, rural faction fights etc. So why exaggerate the number of violent protests? In our view, the answer may be found less in the violence and more in the threat to established order that generals and ministers associate with popular protest. The effect, and possibly the intention, of the official discourse represented above is that it stigmatises protest, an important feature of a democratic society.

We do not doubt that the number of violent protests has increased over recent years (though not nearly to the extent implied in the quotes above), and even if parliament was presented with an accurate assessment of the statistics, it might still support massive expansion of POP. But there is a price to pay. From our broader research we know that the single most important issue propelling community protests is housing - both the sub-standard quality of much public housing and an absolute lack of sufficient dwellings. Assuming that an RDP house costs R150,000 on average, which is about right, the extra R3.3 billion spent on POP would be enough to build more than 200,000 RDP houses, roughly tripling the number completed in recent years. Putting things another way, if we take the SAPS argument at face value, and accept that increased spending on POP can be justified on the basis of the number of violent protests escalating from 1,226 in 2011/12 to 1,907 in 2013/14 (to use Mawela’s figures), then we are being expected to pay nearly R5 million for each one of the extra protests. We doubt the public would regard this as wise use of public funds.

We are disturbed by the way IRIS statistics are being misrepresented because this has implications for criminalisation of the right to protest, for the direction of funds away from the poor, and for holding our leaders accountable.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Peaceful and unrest incidents per year, by provinces, 1997-2013, frequencies and percentages

Table 1: Peaceful incidents by year and by province

		1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Eastern Cape	Count	901	1,467	1,610	1,634	1,595	911	969	838	1,171	1,699	718	377	423	1,059	944	1,084	1,332	18,732
	% within Year	16.9%	17.8%	19.7%	22.9%	21.3%	14.3%	13.8%	10.2%	12.4%	17.0%	10.6%	6.6%	5.4%	9.8%	8.7%	10.7%	12.1%	13.3%
Free State	Count	761	737	609	475	567	364	438	383	609	691	400	335	462	783	611	757	784	9,766
	% within Year	14.3%	8.9%	7.5%	6.7%	7.6%	5.7%	6.2%	4.6%	6.4%	6.9%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	7.2%	5.7%	7.5%	7.1%	6.9%
Gauteng	Count	897	1,554	1,221	1,090	1,166	1,308	1,425	1,577	1,738	1,613	1,413	1,520	2,036	2,209	2,329	1,876	2,356	27,328
	% within Year	16.9%	18.9%	15.0%	15.3%	15.6%	20.5%	20.3%	19.1%	18.3%	16.2%	20.8%	26.7%	25.9%	20.4%	21.6%	18.5%	21.4%	19.4%
KwaZulu-Natal	Count	1,096	1,343	1,237	971	1,220	1,235	1,632	2,117	2,185	2,246	1,132	784	1,727	2,077	2,507	2,267	2,437	28,213
	% within Year	20.6%	16.3%	15.2%	13.6%	16.3%	19.3%	23.2%	25.7%	23.1%	22.5%	16.7%	13.8%	21.9%	19.2%	23.2%	22.3%	22.1%	20.1%
Limpopo	Count	211	401	365	308	528	423	436	672	804	804	606	494	674	1,110	1,115	1,123	967	11,041
	% within Year	4.0%	4.9%	4.5%	4.3%	7.1%	6.6%	6.2%	8.1%	8.5%	8.1%	8.9%	8.7%	8.6%	10.2%	10.3%	11.1%	8.8%	7.9%
Mpumalanga	Count	180	342	287	185	204	143	167	360	423	506	121	92	236	683	551	430	409	5,319
	% within Year	3.4%	4.1%	3.5%	2.6%	2.7%	2.2%	2.4%	4.4%	4.5%	5.1%	1.8%	1.6%	3.0%	6.3%	5.1%	4.2%	3.7%	3.8%
Northern Cape	Count	133	153	172	217	204	182	216	243	445	448	391	275	342	548	470	371	293	5,103
	% within Year	2.5%	1.9%	2.1%	3.0%	2.7%	2.8%	3.1%	2.9%	4.7%	4.5%	5.8%	4.8%	4.3%	5.1%	4.4%	3.7%	2.7%	3.6%
North West	Count	636	1,244	1,567	1,442	1,254	1,272	1,211	1,485	1,500	1,469	1,357	1,359	1,547	1,391	1,441	1,398	1,338	22,911
	% within Year	11.9%	15.1%	19.2%	20.2%	16.8%	19.9%	17.2%	18.0%	15.8%	14.7%	20.0%	23.9%	19.7%	12.8%	13.3%	13.8%	12.2%	16.3%
Western Cape	Count	508	1,000	1,084	806	733	548	541	578	598	505	657	455	425	979	828	852	1,094	12,191
	% within Year	9.5%	12.1%	13.3%	11.3%	9.8%	8.6%	7.7%	7.0%	6.3%	5.1%	9.7%	8.0%	5.4%	9.0%	7.7%	8.4%	9.9%	8.7%
Total	Count	5,323	8,241	8,152	7,128	7,471	6,386	7,035	8,253	9,473	9,981	6,795	5,691	7,872	10,839	10,796	10,158	11,010	140,604
	% within Year	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 2: Unrest incidents by year and by province

		1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Eastern Cape	Count	116	194	125	111	118	53	65	33	123	89	46	37	79	58	92	230	269	1,838
	% within Year	13.1%	16.3%	16.8%	15.6%	18.6%	9.3%	12.1%	5.8%	13.1%	10.4%	6.5%	5.0%	8.9%	6.2%	7.6%	12.7%	15.8%	11.8%
Free State	Count	139	225	75	80	39	24	16	68	168	57	51	63	53	92	136	166	103	1,555
	% within Year	15.7%	18.9%	10.1%	11.3%	6.2%	4.2%	3.0%	12.0%	17.9%	6.7%	7.2%	8.6%	6.0%	9.9%	11.2%	9.2%	6.1%	10.0%
Gauteng	Count	156	214	126	142	112	104	96	105	175	224	189	247	208	210	265	312	433	3,318
	% within Year	17.6%	18.0%	17.0%	20.0%	17.7%	18.3%	17.9%	18.5%	18.6%	26.1%	26.5%	33.6%	23.4%	22.6%	21.8%	17.2%	25.5%	21.2%
KwaZulu-Natal	Count	136	114	104	93	77	65	74	107	100	117	50	69	132	117	157	166	217	1,895
	% within Year	15.3%	9.6%	14.0%	13.1%	12.2%	11.4%	13.8%	18.8%	10.6%	13.7%	7.0%	9.4%	14.9%	12.6%	12.9%	9.2%	12.8%	12.1%
Limpopo	Count	117	94	38	23	20	70	40	35	37	34	36	24	49	54	57	89	100	917
	% within Year	13.2%	7.9%	5.1%	3.2%	3.2%	12.3%	7.5%	6.2%	3.9%	4.0%	5.0%	3.3%	5.5%	5.8%	4.7%	4.9%	5.9%	5.9%
Mpumalanga	Count	34	68	37	29	20	25	21	35	53	83	17	10	53	131	93	183	113	1,005
	% within Year	3.8%	5.7%	5.0%	4.1%	3.2%	4.4%	3.9%	6.2%	5.6%	9.7%	2.4%	1.4%	6.0%	14.1%	7.6%	10.1%	6.7%	6.4%
Northern Cape	Count	27	13	16	33	68	50	41	29	48	9	41	25	41	47	83	90	46	707
	% within Year	3.0%	1.1%	2.2%	4.6%	10.7%	8.8%	7.7%	5.1%	5.1%	1.1%	5.8%	3.4%	4.6%	5.1%	6.8%	5.0%	2.7%	4.5%
North West	Count	73	117	105	88	84	91	83	69	94	77	167	128	124	105	160	305	109	1,979
	% within Year	8.2%	9.8%	14.1%	12.4%	13.3%	16.0%	15.5%	12.1%	10.0%	9.0%	23.4%	17.4%	14.0%	11.3%	13.1%	16.8%	6.4%	12.7%
Western Cape	Count	88	151	117	112	95	87	99	88	141	167	116	133	148	116	175	270	309	2,412
	% within Year	9.9%	12.7%	15.7%	15.8%	15.0%	15.3%	18.5%	15.5%	15.0%	19.5%	16.3%	18.1%	16.7%	12.5%	14.4%	14.9%	18.2%	15.4%
Total	Count	886	1,190	743	711	633	569	535	569	939	857	713	736	887	930	1,218	1,811	1,699	15,626
	% within Year	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Appendix 2: Incidents per 100,000 people by province and eventuality classification

Table 1: Incidents per 100,000 people by province (peaceful)

Province	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Eastern Cape	16.6	26.2	26.1	24.7	23.4	13.1	15.2	12.2	17.9	25.6	11.6	6.2	6.4	17.7	14.0	16.8	20.2
Free State	34.8	31.0	24.1	18.0	21.3	13.5	17.7	14.0	24.8	29.8	15.5	12.3	16.9	31.4	25.2	31.0	29.5
Gauteng	13.4	23.0	16.2	14.2	15.1	16.7	15.7	18.0	19.6	17.3	15.3	14.9	20.2	20.1	20.8	15.7	18.6
KwaZulu Natal	14.0	16.9	14.3	11.1	13.7	13.7	17.1	22.3	23.9	23.7	11.6	8.2	17.1	20.2	23.6	22.5	23.4
Limpopo	4.9	8.0	7.0	5.7	9.5	7.4	8.2	12.6	14.6	15.3	11.8	10.0	13.4	20.7	20.5	21.4	17.7
Mpumalanga	6.5	14.3	10.6	6.8	7.1	4.7	5.8	12.4	14.8	17.5	3.6	2.6	6.5	21.8	16.0	11.2	10.0
Northern Cape	15.9	21.0	20.9	26.3	24.1	23.0	27.7	28.0	52.4	42.4	41.3	28.6	31.8	51.4	45.0	36.2	25.7
North West	27.6	41.8	48.1	41.9	36.3	36.3	32.8	40.3	41.4	45.1	41.9	42.1	47.7	45.2	46.0	40.7	37.4
Western Cape	14.2	37.3	31.6	21.2	18.4	14.1	12.6	14.0	14.3	12.1	15.0	9.4	8.4	19.6	16.2	15.7	18.7
National	13.1	19.6	18.7	16.3	16.8	14.4	15.2	17.7	20.2	21.1	14.2	11.7	16.0	21.7	21.3	19.6	20.8

Table 2: Incidents per 100,000 people by province (unrest)

Province	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Eastern Cape	2.3	4.1	2.1	1.8	1.9	0.8	1.1	0.5	2.0	1.6	0.8	0.6	1.4	0.9	1.4	3.5	4.1
Free State	7.5	13.7	3.6	3.2	1.5	0.9	0.8	3.3	8.8	3.0	2.7	2.8	2.0	3.6	6.5	6.2	3.9
Gauteng	3.4	3.9	1.8	2.1	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.2	2.1	2.6	2.3	2.6	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.6	3.4
KwaZulu Natal	2.0	1.6	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.5	0.5	0.8	1.5	1.2	1.5	1.6	2.1
Limpopo	4.0	2.2	0.8	0.4	0.4	1.4	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.7	1.8
Mpumalanga	1.3	3.1	1.6	1.2	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.4	1.8	3.2	0.5	0.3	1.5	5.3	3.0	4.6	2.9
Northern Cape	3.4	2.9	2.3	4.6	8.4	7.8	5.6	3.4	5.8	0.8	5.5	2.8	3.9	4.5	8.3	8.1	4.0
North West	3.8	5.8	4.5	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.4	2.3	3.2	2.5	5.6	4.1	4.3	3.7	5.3	8.9	3.0
Western Cape	2.9	5.4	3.6	3.2	2.7	2.3	2.3	2.4	3.8	4.7	3.6	4.2	3.1	2.6	3.5	4.8	5.2
National	2.2	2.8	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.4	3.5	3.2

Appendix 3: Categories of 'motives' recorded in IRIS database, 1997-2013, span of use and frequency by peaceful and unrest

		Eventuality Classification		Total
	Span of Use	Crowd (Peaceful)	Crowd (Unrest)	
Attack on Security Force	1997-2013	97	682	779
		0.1%	3.7%	0.5%
Border Dispute	1997-2009	185	131	316
		0.1%	0.7%	0.2%
Busfares	1997-2013	106	54	160
		0.1%	0.3%	0.1%
Campus/Tertiary Conflict	1997-2013	613	315	928
		0.4%	1.7%	0.6%
Conflict Between Community & Gangs	2009-2013	49	20	69
		0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
Conflict Between PAGAD and Gangs	1997-2013	32	10	42
		0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
Conflict Between PADAV and Gangs	1997-2007	8	2	10
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Crime*	1997-1998	256	112	368
		0.2%	0.6%	0.2%
Demand Dismissal of Employee	1997-2013	523	84	607
		0.4%	0.5%	0.4%
Demand Release of Suspects	1997-2013	719	174	893
		0.5%	0.9%	0.5%
Demand Resignation of Councillors	1997-2013	881	391	1,272
		0.6%	2.1%	0.8%
Demand Wage Increases	1997-2013	16,193	1,238	17,431
		10.9%	6.8%	10.4%
Demarcation	2009-2013	98	55	153
		0.1%	0.3%	0.1%
Dispute Between Busses and Taxi's	1997-2013	169	78	247
		0.1%	0.4%	0.1%
Disruption of Assembly	1997-2013	160	108	268
		0.1%	0.6%	0.2%
Dissatisfied With Housing	2009-2013	583	266	849
		0.4%	1.5%	0.5%
Dissatisfied With High Crime rate	1998-2013	3,442	340	3,782
		2.3%	1.9%	2.3%
Dissatisfied With Local	2005-2009	1,693	627	2,320

		Eventuality Classification		Total
	Span of Use	Crowd (Peaceful)	Crowd (Unrest)	
Government				
		1.1%	3.4%	1.4%
Dissatisfied With S/F Action	1997-2013	855	625	1,480
		0.6%	3.4%	0.9%
Dissatisfied With S/F Presence	1997-2013	89	463	552
		0.1%	2.5%	0.3%
Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	2008-2013	2,761	1,733	4,494
		1.9%	9.5%	2.7%
Dissatisfied With Taxi Fares	2009-2013	87	53	140
		0.1%	0.3%	0.1%
Dissatisfied With Unemployment	1999-2013	1,502	328	1,830
		1.0%	1.8%	1.1%
Dissatisfied With Workers Dismissal	1997-2013	1,216	134	1,350
		0.8%	0.7%	0.8%
Election Campaign	2008-2013	1,628	56	1,684
		1.1%	0.3%	1.0%
Establish Altern Structures SOS/POL	1997-2009	2,345	62	2,407
		1.6%	0.3%	1.4%
Establish New Structure/Org	2008-2013	1,287	34	1,321
		0.9%	0.2%	0.8%
Ethnic Conflict	1997-2013	258	98	356
		0.2%	0.5%	0.2%
Expanding of Powerbase	1997-2009	2,640	40	2,680
		1.8%	0.2%	1.6%
Faction Fighting	1997-2013	534	86	620
		0.4%	0.5%	0.4%
For/Against Bail Application	2009-2013	510	18	528
		0.3%	0.1%	0.3%
Forcing of Demands	1997-1999	4,614	784	5,398
		3.1%	4.3%	3.2%
Fuel Prices	1997-2013	47	3	50
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Funeral	2009-2013	815	29	844
		0.5%	0.2%	0.5%
Gang Conflict	1997-2013	147	112	259
		0.1%	0.6%	0.2%
High Cost of Living	2009-2013	45	5	50
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Hostel Conflict	1997-2013	68	26	94
		0.0%	0.1%	0.1%

		Eventuality Classification		Total
	Span of Use	Crowd (Peaceful)	Crowd (Unrest)	
Ideological Conflict	1997-2013	1,058	237	1,295
		0.7%	1.3%	0.8%
Imbizo	2009-2013	1,212	11	1,223
		0.8%	0.1%	0.7%
In Sympathy With Oppressed	1997-2013	2,377	175	2,552
		1.6%	1.0%	1.5%
Inauguration	2009-2013	174	4	178
		0.1%	0.0%	0.1%
Intimidation	1997-2013	433	577	1,010
		0.3%	3.1%	0.6%
Labour Dispute	1997-2013	9,107	946	10,053
		6.1%	5.2%	6%
Mob Justice	2009-2013	47	82	129
		0.0%	0.4%	0.1%
Mobilising of The Masses	1997-2009	2,067	150	2,217
		1.4%	0.8%	1.3%
No Motive Registered	1997-2013	53,831	2,912	56,743
		36.2%	15.9%	33.9%
Opening/Unveiling Ceremony	2009-2013	616	2	618
		0.4%	0%	0.4%
Pension/Grant Dispute	2009-2013	51	0	51
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
People's Court	1997-2013	236	62	298
		0.2%	0.3%	0.2%
Personality Conflict	1997-2013	1,177	378	1,555
		0.8%	2.1%	0.9%
Political Intolerance	1997-2013	1,047	225	1,272
		0.7%	1.2%	0.8%
Prison Conflict/Violence	1997-2012	52	18	70
		0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
Racial Conflict	1997-2013	308	101	409
		0.2%	0.6%	0.2%
Railway Conflict	2009-2013	21	5	26
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Recapitalisation	2009-2013	17	1	18
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Rent	1997-2013	300	51	351
		0.2%	0.3%	0.2%
Resistance To Educational System	1997-2013	730	199	929
		0.5%	1.1%	0.6%
Resistance To Eviction	1997-2013	307	119	426
		0.2%	0.6%	0.3%

		Eventuality Classification		Total
	Span of Use	Crowd (Peaceful)	Crowd (Unrest)	
Resistance To Government Policy	1997-2013	1,505	265	1,770
		1.0%	1.4%	1.1%
Resistance To VAT	1997-2008	7	0	7
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Revenge	1997-2013	138	218	356
		0.1%	1.2%	0.2%
Schools Conflict	1997-2013	1,051	560	1,611
		0.7%	3.1%	1%
Service Charges	1997-2013	1,118	256	1,374
		0.8%	1.4%	0.8%
Social Event	2008-2013	3,980	18	3,998
		2.7%	0.1%	2.4%
Solidarity	1997-2013	6,914	207	7,121
		4.6%	1.1%	4.3%
Sporting Event	2001-2013	6,513	29	6,542
		4.4%	0.2%	3.9%
Suspension of Municipal Services	1998-2013	526	218	744
		0.4%	1.2%	0.4%
Taxi Dispute	1997-2013	1,983	652	2,635
		1.3%	3.6%	1.6%
Train Conflict	1997-2008	51	27	78
		0%	0.1%	0%
Train Fares	2000-2011	8	1	9
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Tribal Court	2009-2013	62	10	72
		0%	0.1%	0.0%
Upset_Violence On Woman/Children	1997-2013	1,747	68	1,815
		1.2%	0.4%	1.1%
Vote	2008-2013	387	16	403
		0.3%	0.1%	0.2%
Voter Registration	2009-2013	178	6	184
		0.1%	0.0%	0.1%
Xenophobia	2008-2013	114	137	251
		0.1%	0.7%	0.2%
Total		148,896	18,331	167,227
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Appendix 4: Definitions and examples of 28 most widely cited categories of 'motives' (excluding no motive registered), 1997-2013

Appendix 4 is available to download from
http://www.uj.ac.za/EN/Faculties/humanities/Research-Centres/South%20Africa%20Research%20Chair%20in%20Social%20Change/Pages/home.aspx

Appendix 5: 5 most commonly used motive options by province (excluding no motive registered), 1997-2008 and 2009-2013

	1997-2008				2009-2013			
Province	**Peaceful**	**%**	**Unrest**	**%**	**Peaceful**	**%**	**Unrest**	**%**
Eastern Cape	Demand Wage Increases	18	Forcing of Demands	8	Demand Wage Increases	26	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	26
	Labour Dispute	12	Dissatisfied With Local Government	7	Labour Dispute	8	Dissatisfied With Housing	8
	Forcing of Demands	5	Labour Dispute	7	Sporting Event	5	Demand Wage Increases	7
	Solidarity	4	Intimidation	6	Social Event	5	Labour Dispute	6
	Dissatisfied With High Crime Rate	2	Schools Conflict	5	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	4	Schools Conflict	5
Free State	Demand Wage Increases	11	Dissatisfied With Local Government	9	Demand Wage Increases	16	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	31
	Labour Dispute	9	Forcing of Demands & Intimidation	9	Sporting Event	14	In Sympathy With Oppressed	7
	In Sympathy With Oppressed	9	Dissatisfied With S/F Presence	8	Labour Dispute	8	Demand Wage Increases	7
	Forcing of Demands	8	Schools Conflict	7	In Sympathy With Oppressed	7	Labour Dispute	6
	Solidarity	6	Service Charges	6	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	6	Schools Conflict	4
Gauteng	Labour Dispute	7	Labour Dispute	8	Demand Wage Increases	13	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	27

	1997-2008				2009-2013			
	Sporting Event	6	Demand Wage Increases	7	Sporting Event	9	Demand Wage Increases	10
	Demand Wage Increases	6	Forcing of Demands	6	Social Event	6	Dissatisfied With Housing	5
	Solidarity	5	Dissatisfied With Local Government	6	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	6	Labour Dispute	4
	Forcing of Demands	5	Taxi Dispute	5	Labour Dispute	5	Dissatisfied With High Crime Rate	3
KwaZulu-Natal	Solidarity	9	Taxi Dispute	9	Social Event	10	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	18
	Demand Wage Increases	6	Labour Dispute	7	Demand Wage Increases	10	Demand Wage Increases	10
	Expanding of Powerbase	4	Demand Wage Increases	6	Election Campaign	6	Campus/Tertiary Conflict	6
	Labour Dispute	4	Campus/Tertiary Conflict	5	Funeral 5	5	Taxi Dispute	5
	Taxi Dispute	3	Forcing of Demands	5	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	4	Dissatisfied With Taxi Fares	4
Limpopo	Demand Wage Increases	7	Forcing of Demands	13	Demand of Wage Increases	15	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	12
	Dissatisfied With High Crime Rate	5	Border Dispute	11	Social Event	8	Demand Wage Increases	8
	Solidarity	4	Taxi Dispute	5	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	5	Labour Dispute	6
	Sporting Event	4	Dissatisfied With High Crime Rate	5	Sporting Event	4	Dissatisfied With High Crime Rate	6
	Forcing of Demands	3	Schools Conflict	4	Imbizo	3	Dissatisfied With Unemployment	4
Mpumalanga	Mobilising of the Masses	15	Forcing of Demands & Taxi	10	Demand Wage	20	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	39

	1997-2008				2009-2013			
			Dispute		Increases			
	Demand Wage Increases	9	Demand Wage Increases	9	Social Event	10	Demand Resignation of Councillors	10
	Forcing of Demands	9	Labour Dispute	8	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	8	Demand Wage Increases & Dissatisfied With Unemployment	8
	Labour Dispute	7	Schools Conflict	7	Imbizo -	7	Demarcation	5
	Dissatisfied With High Crime Rate	5	Mobilising of The Masses	6	Sporting Event	6	Labour Dispute	3
Northern Cape	Solidarity	16	Personality Conflict	10	Demand Wage Increases	10	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	30
	Demand Wage Increases	7	Labour Dispute	9	Sporting Event	9	Demand Resignation of Councillors	11
	Labour Dispute	7	Dissatisfied With S/F Action	7	Solidarity	9	Demand Wage Increases	6
	Personality Conflict	5	Dissatisfied With Unemployment	5	Social Event	8	Dissatisfied With Unemployment & Labour Dispute	5
	Forcing of Demands	5	Demand Wage Increases & Solidarity	5	Labour Dispute	5	Dissatisfied With Housing	4
North West	Demand Wage Increases	7	Dissatisfied With Local Government	8	Demand Wage Increases	15	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	33
	Establish Altern Structures SOS/POL	6	Forcing of Demands	6	Social Event	11	Demand Wage Increases	11
	Solidarity	5	Schools Conflict	6	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	7	Dissatisfied With Unemployment	9
	Labour Dispute	4	Attack on Security Force	5	Establish New Structure/Org	7	Labour Dispute	9
	Expanding of Powerbase	4	Intimidation	5	Sporting Event	6	Dissatisfied With High Crime Rate	4

	1997-2008				2009-2013			
Western Cape	Labour Dispute	14	Dissatisfied With S/F Action	15	Demand Wage Increases	7	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	11
	Demand Wage Increases	12	Attack on Security Force	11	Dissatisfied With Service Delivery	4	Demand Wage Increases	14
	Forcing of Demands	10	Dissatisfied With S/F Presence	8	Sporting Event	3	Dissatisfied With Housing	5
	Solidarity	5	Labour Dispute	7	Labour Dispute	3	Attack on Security Force	2
	Dissatisfied With High Crime Rate	4	Demand Wage Increases	6	Dissatisfied With Housing	3	Labour Dispute	2

Appendix 6: Allocation of unassigned sample to motive groups

Table 1: Unassigned sample (peaceful)

			Community Related Issues	Labour Related	Education Related	Official Government and Party Political Events	Recreational Religous and Cultural Events	Crime Related	Transport Related	Election Related	Xenophobia and Racism	Other	Total
Peaceful	Establish Altern Structures	Count	4	1	1	15	4	3	0	2	0	1	31
		% within Motive	12.9%	3.2%	3.2%	48.4%	12.9%	9.7%	0.0%	6.5%	0.0%	3.2%	100.0%
	In Sympathy with the	Count	7	10	0	3	7	4	0	0	1	9	41
		% within Motive	17.1%	24.4%	0.0%	7.3%	17.1%	9.8%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	22.0%	100.0%
	Mobilising of The Masses	Count	10	2	1	14	2	6	0	4	0	0	39
		% within Motive	25.6%	5.1%	2.6%	35.9%	5.1%	15.4%	0.0%	10.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Solidarity	Count	14	4	2	32	29	3	1	5	0	9	99
		% within Motive	14.1%	4.0%	2.0%	32.3%	29.3%	3.0%	1.0%	5.1%	0.0%	9.1%	100.0%
	Total	Count	35	17	4	64	42	16	1	11	1	19	210
		% within Motive	16.7%	8.1%	1.9%	30.5%	20.0%	7.6%	.5%	5.2%	.5%	9.0%	100.0%

Table 2: Unassigned sample (unrest)

			Community Related Issues	Labour Related	Education Related	Official Government and Party Political Events	Recreational Religous and Cultural Events	Crime Related	Transport Related	Election Related	Xenophobia and Racism	Other	Total
Unrest	Establish Altern Structures	Count	8	1	2	0	0	5	1	0	0	1	18
		% within Motive	44.4%	5.6%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	27.8%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	100.0%
	In Sympathy with the	Count	7	9	1	1	0	6	0	1	1	5	31
		% within Motive	22.6%	29.0%	3.2%	3.2%	0.0%	19.4%	0.0%	3.2%	3.2%	16.1%	100.0%
	Mobilising of The Masses	Count	17	2	4	2	2	11	1	0	0	2	41
		% within Motive	41.5%	4.9%	9.8%	4.9%	4.9%	26.8%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	4.9%	100.0%
	Solidarity	Count	11	5	6	3	1	17	2	0	1	4	50
		% within Motive	22.0%	10.0%	12.0%	6.0%	2.0%	34.0%	4.0%	0.0%	2.0%	8.0%	100.0%
	Total	Count	43	17	13	6	3	39	4	1	2	12	140
		% within Motive	30.7%	12.1%	9.3%	4.3%	2.1%	27.9%	2.9%	.7%	1.4%	8.6%	100.0%

Table 3: Unassigned sample (peaceful and unrest)

			Community Related Issues	Labour Related	Education Related	Official Government and Party Political Events	Recreational Religous and Cultural Events	Crime Related	Transport Related	Election Related	Xenophobia and Racism	Other	Total
Total	Establish Altern Structures	Count	12	2	3	15	4	8	1	2	0	2	49
		% within Motive	24.5%	4.1%	6.1%	30.6%	8.2%	16.3%	2.0%	4.1%	0.0%	4.1%	100.0%
	In Sympathy with the	Count	14	19	1	4	7	10	0	1	2	14	72
		% within Motive	19.4%	26.4%	1.4%	5.6%	9.7%	13.9%	0.0%	1.4%	2.8%	19.4%	100.0%
	Mobilising of The Masses	Count	27	4	5	16	4	17	1	4	0	2	80
		% within Motive	33.8%	5.0%	6.3%	20.0%	5.0%	21.3%	1.3%	5.0%	0.0%	2.5%	100.0%
	Solidarity	Count	25	9	8	35	30	20	3	5	1	13	149
		% within Motive	16.8%	6.0%	5.4%	23.5%	20.1%	13.4%	2.0%	3.4%	.7%	8.7%	100.0%
	Total	Count	78	34	17	70	45	55	5	12	3	31	350
		% within Motive	22.3%	9.7%	4.9%	20.0%	12.9%	15.7%	1.4%	3.4%	.9%	8.9%	100.0%

Appendix 7: Motive options assigned to aggregate motive categories

Category	Description	Motives
Community protest	Incidents where a geographically defined community raises an issue of concern, excluding issues of education, crime, transport or xenophobia	Demand resignation of councillors Dissatisfied with housing Dissatisfied with local government Dissatisfied with service delivery High cost of living Rent Resistance to eviction Suspension of municipal services Upset violence in women/children Service Charges
Labour Related	Incidents related to labour-related issues	Demand dismissal of employee Demand wage increases Dissatisfied with unemployment Dissatisfied with workers dismissal Labour dispute
Education Related	Incidents related to any form of education-related issue including tertiary-related education issues	Campus/Tertiary conflict Resistance to educational system Schools conflict
Official Government and Party Political Events	Incidents related to official government or party political events	Expanding of power base Imbizo Inauguration Opening/Unveiling ceremony Tribal court
Recreational and Religious Events	Incidents related to sporting, musical, religious and other recreational or cultural events	Funeral Social event Sporting event
Crime and Policing Related	Incidents related to issues of crime and crime-related policing	Conflict between the community/gangs Community between Pagad and gangs Conflict between Pagad and gangs Crime* Crime prevention Demand release of suspects Dissatisfied with high crime rate Dissatisfied with S/F action Dissatisfied with S/F presence For/Against bail application Gang conflict Mob justice Peoples' Courts Prison conflict/violence Revenge Attack on Security Forces
Transport Related	Incidents related to any form of transport	Bus fares Dispute between buses and taxis Dissatisfied with taxi fares Fuel prices Railway conflict Taxi dispute

Category	Description	Motives
		Train conflict Train fares
Elections	Incidents related to any form of election	Election campaign Vote Voter registration
Racism and Xenophobia	Incidents related to racism or xenophobia	Ethnic conflict Racial conflict Xenophobia
Other	Incidents which cannot be classified under one of the categories above or do not have a consistent application.	Border dispute Cross border conflicts Demarcation Disruption of assembly Faction fighting Hostel conflict Intimidation Pension dispute Pension/Grant dispute Recapitalisation Political Intolerance Personality Conflict Ideological Conflict

Appendix 8: Approximate percentage of aggregated motives by year, 1997-2013, peaceful and unrest

Table 1: Approximate percentage of aggregated motives by year (peaceful), 1997-2013

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Community Issues	1,469	1,968	1,330	1,220	1,265	1,073	1,114	1,240	1,735	1,558	1,210	1,105	1,350	1,399	1,468	1,700	1,686
	24%	20%	15%	12%	16%	16%	15%	14%	17%	15%	17%	18%	16%	12%	13%	16%	15%
Labour Related	1,952	3,346	2,358	1,411	1,517	1,332	1,471	1,468	2,622	3,400	2,266	915	1,632	3,272	2,445	2,305	2,579
	32%	34%	27%	14%	20%	20%	20%	17%	26%	32%	31%	15%	20%	29%	22%	22%	23%
Education Related	184	335	197	212	173	128	150	150	193	168	167	113	156	182	213	233	264
	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Official Events	597	1,043	1,645	1,180	1,093	950	1,117	1,683	1,402	1,541	902	1,038	966	1,205	1,483	1,377	1,353
	10%	11%	19%	12%	14%	14%	15%	20%	14%	14%	12%	17%	12%	11%	13%	13%	12%
Recreational, Cultural or Religious Events	942	1,125	1,389	1,352	1,479	1,407	1,679	2,001	2,139	1,945	1,430	1,420	2,165	3,718	2,743	2,676	2,817
	15%	12%	16%	14%	19%	21%	23%	23%	21%	18%	20%	24%	26%	32%	25%	26%	26%
Crime and Policing Related	294	702	712	797	816	696	676	745	746	806	514	495	353	641	829	898	995
	5%	7%	8%	8%	11%	10%	9%	9%	7%	8&	7%	8%	7%	6%	8%	9%	9%
Transport Related	17	245	232	209	250	149	145	174	212	178	131	156	140	128	157	229	199
	0.3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Elections Related	63	110	118	119	117	102	118	141	146	150	97	119	672	263	954	336	426
	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%	8%	2%	9%	3%	4%
Racism and Xenophobia	44	56	27	58	80	43	27	30	43	36	20	104	31	38	47	43	26
	1%	1%	0.3%	1%	1%	1%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.2%
Other	534	838	832	3,238	942	767	818	921	857	868	535	552	552	620	711	655	688
	9%	9%	9%	33%	12%	12%	11%	11%	8%	8%	7%	9%	7%	5%	6%	6%	6%
Total	6,095	9,768	8,840	9,795	7,732	6,646	7,315	8,553	10,094	10,650	7,272	6,016	8,198	11,465	11,050	10,452	11,033
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 2: Approximate percentage of aggregated motives by year (unrest), 1997-2013

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Community Issues	261	304	152	103	102	101	89	107	344	209	313	201	381	393	428	855	647
	21%	18%	12%	13%	14%	16%	15%	16%	30%	20%	35%	22%	38%	36%	32%	46%	38%
Labour Related	308	426	246	141	110	119	91	91	210	214	128	92	154	212	246	460	312
	25%	25%	19%	17%	15%	19%	15%	14%	18%	20%	14%	10%	15%	20%	18%	25%	18%
Education Related	83	140	141	102	56	50	47	46	84	60	41	50	42	87	54	86	94
	7%	8%	11%	12%	8%	8%	8%	7%	7%	6%	5%	6%	4%	8%	4%	5%	5%
Official Events	17	25	29	27	27	28	24	31	28	39	29	33	36	33	68	20	73
	1%	1%	2%	3%	4%	4%	4%	5%	2%	4%	3%	4%	4%	3%	5%	1%	4%
Recreational, Cultural or Religious Events	18	30	38	33	39	40	37	32	41	42	34	47	63	55	94	44	119
	1%	2%	3%	4%	5%	6%	6%	5%	4%	4%	4%	5%	6%	5%	7%	2%	7%
Crime and Policing Related	236	391	397	190	175	171	173	196	241	252	209	227	183	135	185	162	220
	19%	23%	30%	23%	24%	27%	29%	29%	21%	24%	23%	25%	18%	12%	14%	9%	13%
Transport Related	45	98	99	67	56	39	45	55	79	94	34	39	39	31	50	75	80
	4%	6%	7%	8%	8%	6%	7%	8%	7%	9%	4%	4%	4%	3%	4%	4%	5%
Elections Related	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	17	8	54	9	13
	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%	1%	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	2%	1%	4%	0.0%	1%
Racism and Xenophobi	19	52	52	9	8	2	6	3	9	9	9	120	10	16	10	18	31
	21%	15%	12%	17%	19%	14%	15%	16%	10%	13%	10%	10%	8%	10%	11%	6%	8%
Other	1,247	1,728	1,320	816	716	644	604	672	1,150	1,060	891	900	1,007	1,079	1,332	1,842	1,720
	21%	15%	12%	17%	19%	14%	15%	16%	10%	13%	10%	10%	8%	10%	11%	6%	8%
Total	1,247	1,728	1,320	816	716	644	604	672	1,154	1,060	891	900	1,007	1,079	1,332	1,842	1,720
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Appendix 9: Approximate percentage of aggregated motives by province




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Other
Racism and Xenophobia
Elections Related
Transport Related
Crime and Policing Related
Recreational, Cultural and Religious Events
Official Events
Education Related
Labour Related
Community Issues
0
5
10
15
20
25
Unrest
Peaceful


Mpumalanga
Other
Racism and Xenophobia
Elections Related
Transport Related
Crime and Policing Related
Recreational, Cultural and Religious Events
Official Events
Education Related
Labour Related
Community Issues
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Unrest
Peaceful


Limpopo
Other
Racism and Xenophobia
Elections Related
Transport Related
Crime and Policing Related
Recreational, Cultural and Religious Events
Official Events
Education Related
Labour Related
Community Issues
0
5
10
15
20
25
Unrest
Peaceful


Northern Cape
Other
Racism and Xenophobia
Elections Related
Transport Related
Crime and Policing Related
Recreational, Cultural and Religious Events
Official Events
Education Related
Labour Related
Community Issues
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Unrest
Peaceful


North West
Other
Racism and Xenophobia
Elections Related
Transport Related
Crime and Policing Related
Recreational, Cultural and Religious Events
Official Events
Education Related
Labour Related
Community Issues
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Unrest
Peaceful


Western Cape
Other
Racism and Xenophobia
Elections Related
Transport Related
Crime and Policing Related
Recreational, Cultural and Religious Events
Official Events
Education Related
Labour Related
Community Issues
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Unrest
Peaceful

Appendix 10. Top 10 most frequent ‘residentials’ recorded in IRIS database, listed by province

Table 1: Eastern Cape

Eastern Cape	Frequency	Percent
Mthatha	1687	8.2
Lusikisiki	1245	6.1
Port Elizabeth	1004	4.9
East London	987	4.8
Uitenhage	749	3.6
Qumbu	730	3.5
Queenstown	517	2.5
Port St. John's	478	2.3
King Williams Town	434	2.1
New Brighton (PE)	421	2

Table 2: Free State

Free State	Frequency	Percent
Bloemfontein	3334	29.4
Botshabelo	823	7.3
Welkom	522	4.6
Phuthaditjaba	491	4.3
Bethlehem	381	3.4
Thaba Nchu	336	3
Thabong (Welkom)	274	2.4
Kroonstad	189	1.7
Sasolburg	172	1.5
Bohlokong (Bethlehem)	157	1.4

Table 3: Gauteng

Gauteng	Frequency	Percent
Pretoria	3389	11.1
Johannesburg	2868	9.4
Soshanguve (Pretoria)	671	2.2
Tembisa (Kemptonpark)	576	1.9
Mamelodi (Pretoria)	575	1.9
Vereeniging	553	1.8
Atteridgeville (Pretoria)	544	1.8
Germiston	532	1.7
Sebokeng (Vereeniging)	468	1.5
Arcadia (Pretoria)	460	1.5

Table 4: KwaZulu-Natal

KwaZulu-Natal	Frequency	Percent
Durban	2,908	9.7
Pietermaritzburg	1,959	6.5
Umlazi (Durban)	1,140	3.8
Richards Bay	848	2.8
Newcastle	715	2.4
Ulundi	667	2.2
Empangeni	649	2.2
Nongoma	648	2.2
Kwa Mashu	499	1.7
Chatsworth (Durban)	490	1.6

Table 5: Limpopo

Limpopo	Frequency	Percent
Thohoyandou	1610	13.5
Polokwane	1365	11.4
Giyani	621	5.2
Pietersburg	410	3.4
Makhado	390	3.3
Mankweng	387	3.2
Lebowakgomo	337	2.8
Lephalale	269	2.2
Sibasa	248	2.1
Mecklenburg	245	2

Table 6: Mpumalanga

Mpumalanga	Frequency	Percent
Nelspruit	745	11.8
Witbank	247	3.9
Middelburg (Mpl)	238	3.8
Kwaguqa (Witbank)	224	3.5
Kanyamazane (Nelspruit)	186	2.9
Ermelo	174	2.8
Kwamhlanga (A)	134	2.1
Tonga	134	2.1
Embalenhle (Secunda)	123	1.9
Mhluzi (Middelburg)	118	1.9

Table 7: Northern Cape

Northern Cape	Frequency	Percent
Kimberley	1588	27.3
Upington	616	10.6
Galeshewe (Kimberley)	571	9.8
Kuruman	244	4.2
Springbok	151	2.6
De Aar	130	2.2
Barkley-Wes	108	1.9
Postmasburg	100	1.7
Jan Kempdorp	95	1.6
Olifantshoek	88	1.5

Table 8: North West

North West	Frequency	Percent
Rustenburg	3013	12.1
Mmabatho	1437	5.8
Potchefstroom	1370	5.5
Klerksdorp	897	3.6
Mahikeng	892	3.6
Phokeng (Rustenburg)	850	3.4
Vryburg	769	3.1
Mogwase (Rustenburg)	641	2.6
Brits	615	2.5
Sun City	525	2.1

Table 9: Western Cape

Western Cape	Frequency	Percent
Cape Town	2302	15.8
George	673	4.6
Khayelitsha (Bellville)	605	4.1
Oudtshoorn	558	3.8
Athlone (Cape Town)	465	3.2
Nyanga (Cape Town)	402	2.8
Paarl	362	2.5
Newlands (Wynberg)	309	2.1
Beaufort-West	269	1.8
Knysna	268	1.8

Appendix 11: Categories of 'environmentals' recorded in IRIS database, 1997-2013 (peaceful and unrest)

		Crowd (Peaceful)	Crowd (Unrest)	Total
Environment	Aircraft	19	1	20
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Airport	538	25	563
		0.4%	0.2%	0.4%
	Amusement Park	295	6	301
		0.2%	0.0%	0.2%
	Banks	124	4	128
		0.1%	0.0%	0.1%
	Beach Area	548	6	554
		0.4%	0.0%	0.4%
	BorderPost	87	17	104
		0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
	Building Site	808	71	879
		0.6%	0.5%	0.6%
	Busstop/Bus Terminal	342	62	404
		0.2%	0.4%	0.3%
	Cravan Park	38	0	38
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Cemetry	1,459	45	1,504
		1.0%	0.3%	1.0%
	Church	1,779	54	1,833
		1.3%	0.3%	1.2%
	City Hall/Town Hall	4,828	139	4,967
		3.4%	0.9%	3.2%
	Community Hall	8,663	225	8,888
		6.2%	1.4%	5.7%
	Courthouse	5,859	128	5,987
		4.2%	0.8%	3.8%
	Craft/Sea Craft	9	2	11
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Disco	19	7	26
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Dwelling	430	148	578
		0.3%	0.9%	0.4%
	Embassy/Consulate	451	9	460
		0.3%	0.1%	0.3%
	Filling Station	249	16	265
		0.2%	0.1%	0.2%
	Flea Market	66	2	68
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Hospital/Clinic	2,328	101	2,429

		Crowd (Peaceful)	Crowd (Unrest)	Total
		1.7%	0.6%	1.6%
	Hostel/Compound	686	130	816
		0.5%	0.8%	0.5%
	Hotel/Motel	1,993	27	2,020
		1.4%	0.2%	1.3%
	House of Parliament	713	17	730
		0.5%	0.1%	0.5%
	Industrial Area	7,715	608	8,323
		5.5%	3.9%	5.3%
	Kraal	2,440	52	2,492
		1.7%	0.3%	1.6%
	Market	143	12	155
		0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
	Military Base/Grounds	143	11	154
		0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
	Mining Property	2,809	362	3,171
		2.0%	2.3%	2.0%
	Mobile Police Station	8	1	9
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	National Key Point	482	18	500
		0.3%	0.1%	0.3%
	Nature Reserve	281	7	288
		0.2%	0.0%	0.2%
	Parcade	42	3	45
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Park	2,134	71	2,205
		1.5%	0.5%	1.4%
	Parking Area	981	37	1,018
		0.7%	0.2%	0.7%
	Paypoint	125	2	127
		0.1%	0.0%	0.1%
	Place of Amusement	409	12	421
		0.3%	0.1%	0.3%
	Police Station/Property	1,897	202	2,099
		1.3%	1.3%	1.3%
	Polling Booth	612	25	637
		0.4%	0.2%	0.4%
	Post Office	409	14	423
		0.3%	0.1%	0.3%
	Prison/Place of Safekeeping	294	33	327
		0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
	Private Building	3,484	322	3,806
		2.5%	2.1%	2.4%
	Public Building	5,282	329	5,611
		3.8%	2.1%	3.6%

		Crowd (Peaceful)	Crowd (Unrest)	Total
	Public Road	14,685	4,707	19,392
		10.4%	30.1%	12.4%
	Public Service Building	3,816	219	4,035
		2.7%	1.4%	2.6%
	Public Toilet	4	4	8
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Railway Station	487	97	584
		0.3%	0.6%	0.4%
	Recreation Resort	1,019	22	1,041
		0.7%	0.1%	0.7%
	Rehabilitation Centre	36	4	40
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Residential Area	14,688	3,687	18,375
		10.4%	23.6%	11.8%
	Safety Camp	13	0	13
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Satellite Police Station	41	5	46
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	School Premises	7,399	915	8,314
		5.3%	5.9%	5.3%
	Sea Harbour	220	23	243
		0.2%	0.1%	0.2%
	Shebeen	29	89	118
		0.0%	0.6%	0.1%
	Shopping Center	4,017	239	4,256
		2.9%	1.5%	2.7%
	Showgrounds	1,298	18	1,316
		0.9%	0.1%	0.8%
	Smallholding/Farm(Occupied)	906	117	1,023
		0.6%	0.7%	0.7%
	Smallholding/Farm(Unoccupied)	132	10	142
		0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
	Spoornet Property	123	14	137
		0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
	Sports Stadium	19,966	243	20,209
		14.2%	1.6%	12.9%
	Squartter Camp	1,175	588	1,763
		0.8%	3.8%	1.1%
	Squatter's Hut	39	25	64
		0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
	Swimming Pool	39	5	44
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Taxi Rank	1,488	428	1,916
		1.1%	2.7%	1.2%
	Technicon	391	103	494

		Crowd (Peaceful)	Crowd (Unrest)	Total
		0.3%	0.7%	0.3%
	Tertiary Institution	860	161	1,021
		0.6%	1.0%	0.7%
	Toll-Gate	91	6	97
		0.1%	0.0%	0.1%
	Train	57	22	79
		0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
	Tribal Area	2,440	120	2,560
		1.7%	0.8%	1.6%
	Union Buildings	361	10	371
		0.3%	0.1%	0.2%
	University	1,416	288	1,704
		1.0%	1.8%	1.1%
	Unoccupied Area	1,334	91	1,425
		0.9%	0.6%	0.9%
	Vehicle	13	3	16
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total		140,604	15,626	156,230
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

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